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724D.M. Armstrong And Norman Malcolm, Consciousness And Causality (review)Philosophy in Review 5 279-281. 1985.
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638A Short Vindication of Reichenbach's «Event-Splitting»Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122): 143-152. 1988.In "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" Donald Davidson argues that Hans Reichenbach's analysis of action and event sentences is "radically defective." I show that Reichenbach can easily deflect Davidson's objections, thus leaving their respective accounts largely comparable.
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662Review – Correct English: Reality or Myth?Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (10). 2017.Geoffrey Marnell presents philosophical arguments favoring grammatical descriptivism over grammatical prescriptivism. I argue that his explanation and defence of descriptivism reveal that his descriptivism is itself prescriptivist.
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91Thomson on events and the causal criterionPhilosophical Studies 39 (3). 1981.JUDITH THOMSON, IN "ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS", PURPORTS TO PROVIDE A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S CAUSAL CRITERION OF EVENT IDENTITY. IT IS SHOWN THAT ONCE A CERTAIN ASSUMPTION MADE BY THOMSON IS REPLACED BY A MORE PLAUSIBLE VARIANT, HER EXAMPLE IS NO LONGER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DAVIDSON'S CRITERION.
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89A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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760Some by the Way Remarks on Wreen's 'By' WaysAnalysis 48 (2). 1988.WREEN'S PROPOSAL FOR AVOIDING CAUSAL LOOPS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF ACTION IS, I ARGUE, ITSELF LOOPY.
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3Causal capacities and the inherently funnyConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 27 (70): 149-159. 1994.It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf …Read more
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100Yu guang‐Yuan's two categories of matterJournal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1): 57-62. 1985.IN "THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON MATTER", "CHINESE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY" 12 (1981) PAGES 38-54, YU CLAIMS THAT IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW CONSCIOUSNESS CAN AFFECT THE PHYSICAL WORLD, TWO CATEGORIES OF MATTER MUST BE DISTINGUISHED. I ARGUE THAT YU'S DISTINCTION HAS NO EXPLANATORY FORCE AND, MOREOVER, IS AT ODDS WITH HIS MATERIALIST ASSUMPTIONS. I THEN SUGGEST OTHER STRATEGIES.
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69"When" In DoubtCogito 5 (1): 46-49. 1991.Some problems are raised regarding the interpretation of the temporal sentence connective "when" in introductory logic courses.
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73More on Morreall on LaughterDialogue 26 (1): 161-. 1987.ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE MUSTERED AGAINST MORREALL'S CONTENTION THAT BEING EFFECTED BY A PLEASANT PSYCHOLOGICAL "SHIFT" IS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF LAUGHTER.
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63A Note on the v-Elimination RuleCogito 4 (1): 69-70. 1990.The paper reports that the explanations of the v-elimination rule in three commonly used introductory logic textbooks are misleading to students and can result in invalid inferences.
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154Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbersJournal of Philosophical Research 17 347-50. 1992.This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails
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112Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 757-758. 1987.
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601Intentionality and the non-psychologicalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 531-54. 1986.IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.
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6527On Bullshit Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.According to Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshitting and lying necessarily differ in intention. I argue contra Frankfurt that (i) bullshitting can be lying, and that (ii) bullshitting need involve neither misrepresentation nor intention to deceive. My discussion suggests that bullshit is not capturable by a simple formula and that, although illuminating, Frankfurt’s analysis is limited to one paradigm.
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85Chisholm on expressions for intentional relationsPhilosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
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152A problem of motivation for multipliersSouthern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 209-224. 1982.GOLDMAN HAS RAISED THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS AGAINST DAVIDSON'S UNIFYING APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS AND EVENTS. THESE OBJECTIONS—A CAUSAL OBJECTION, A RELATIONAL OBJECTION, AND A TEMPORAL OBJECTION—ARE TAKEN AS MOTIVATION FOR HIS OWN MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT IS ITSELF NOT ADEQUATE TO THESE OBJECTIONS.
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