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Karl Pfeifer

University of Saskatchewan
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    53
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    4
  •  Events
    1
  •  News and Updates
    19
  •  Teaching Materials
    1
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • University of Saskatchewan
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor Emeritus
University of Calgary
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1980
Homepage
Wantirna South, VIC, Australia
0000-0001-8059-6008
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Aesthetics
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
20th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (53)
  •  724
    D.M. Armstrong And Norman Malcolm, Consciousness And Causality (review)
    Philosophy in Review 5 279-281. 1985.
    20th Century PhilosophyAustrian PhilosophyBritish Philosophy
  •  638
    A Short Vindication of Reichenbach's «Event-Splitting»
    Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122): 143-152. 1988.
    In "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" Donald Davidson argues that Hans Reichenbach's analysis of action and event sentences is "radically defective." I show that Reichenbach can easily deflect Davidson's objections, thus leaving their respective accounts largely comparable.
    Philosophy of Action, MiscLogic in PhilosophyLogical Expressions
  •  662
    Review – Correct English: Reality or Myth?
    Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (10). 2017.
    Geoffrey Marnell presents philosophical arguments favoring grammatical descriptivism over grammatical prescriptivism. I argue that his explanation and defence of descriptivism reveal that his descriptivism is itself prescriptivist.
    Philosophy, MiscPhilosophy of Language, Misc
  •  91
    Thomson on events and the causal criterion
    Philosophical Studies 39 (3). 1981.
    JUDITH THOMSON, IN "ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS", PURPORTS TO PROVIDE A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S CAUSAL CRITERION OF EVENT IDENTITY. IT IS SHOWN THAT ONCE A CERTAIN ASSUMPTION MADE BY THOMSON IS REPLACED BY A MORE PLAUSIBLE VARIANT, HER EXAMPLE IS NO LONGER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DAVIDSON'S CRITERION.
    EventsAction Theory, MiscKnowledge of Action
  •  83
    Laughing Matters
    Dialogue 22 (4): 695-698. 1983.
  •  882
    Carl Ginet, On Action (review)
    Philosophy in Review 12 196-199. 1992.
    Defining ActionThe Structure of ActionVolitional Theories of ActionNoncausal Theories of ActionVolit…Read more
    Defining ActionThe Structure of ActionVolitional Theories of ActionNoncausal Theories of ActionVolitionTryingIntentional ActionAbilitiesThe Nature of IntentionAgencyExplanation of Action, MiscPsychological ExplanationReasons and CausesTheories of FreedomIncompatibilismFree Will and Responsibility
  •  89
    A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying Account
    Philosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.
    A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
  •  760
    Some by the Way Remarks on Wreen's 'By' Ways
    Analysis 48 (2). 1988.
    WREEN'S PROPOSAL FOR AVOIDING CAUSAL LOOPS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF ACTION IS, I ARGUE, ITSELF LOOPY.
    British PhilosophyMetaphysics, Misc
  •  665
    Jenny Teichman, Philosophy and the Mind (review)
    Philosophy in Review 10 (8): 332-333. 1990.
    Philosophy of Mind, General WorksPhilosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  3
    Causal capacities and the inherently funny
    Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 27 (70): 149-159. 1994.
    It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf …Read more
    It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf die subjektiven Reaktionen einer Person oder einer gesellschaftlichen Gruppe. Ich jedoch argumentiere dafür, daß diese Ansicht nicht damit in Einklang zu bringen ist, wie wir reden, wenn wir etwas als humorvoll oder als humorlos bewerten, Das Verständnis soIcher Diskurse scheint es zu erfordern, daß Witzigkeit eine objektive Angelegenheit ist. Im Anschluß daran skizziere ich einen Ansatz der "kausalen Fähigkeiten", der zu erklären vermag, wie eine solche Objektivität moglich ist.
  •  100
    Yu guang‐Yuan's two categories of matter
    Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1): 57-62. 1985.
    IN "THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON MATTER", "CHINESE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY" 12 (1981) PAGES 38-54, YU CLAIMS THAT IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW CONSCIOUSNESS CAN AFFECT THE PHYSICAL WORLD, TWO CATEGORIES OF MATTER MUST BE DISTINGUISHED. I ARGUE THAT YU'S DISTINCTION HAS NO EXPLANATORY FORCE AND, MOREOVER, IS AT ODDS WITH HIS MATERIALIST ASSUMPTIONS. I THEN SUGGEST OTHER STRATEGIES.
    Chinese Philosophy: Metaphysics and Epistemology
  •  69
    "When" In Doubt
    Cogito 5 (1): 46-49. 1991.
    Some problems are raised regarding the interpretation of the temporal sentence connective "when" in introductory logic courses.
    Teaching Philosophy, MiscInformal LogicIntroductions to Logic
  •  73
    More on Morreall on Laughter
    Dialogue 26 (1): 161-. 1987.
    ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE MUSTERED AGAINST MORREALL'S CONTENTION THAT BEING EFFECTED BY A PLEASANT PSYCHOLOGICAL "SHIFT" IS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF LAUGHTER.
    HumourPhilosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  490
    Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind (review)
    Philosophy in Review 4 (6): 278-280. 1984.
    Cognitive Closure
  •  63
    A Note on the v-Elimination Rule
    Cogito 4 (1): 69-70. 1990.
    The paper reports that the explanations of the v-elimination rule in three commonly used introductory logic textbooks are misleading to students and can result in invalid inferences.
    Introductions to LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscTeaching Philosophy, Misc
  •  154
    Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers
    Journal of Philosophical Research 17 347-50. 1992.
    This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails
    Chinese Room ArgumentMental States and ProcessesIntentionalityRepresentation in Artificial Intellige…Read more
    Chinese Room ArgumentMental States and ProcessesIntentionalityRepresentation in Artificial Intelligence
  •  570
    Kathleen Lennon, Explaining Human Action (review)
    Philosophy in Review 11 (4): 263-265. 1991.
    Explanation of Action, MiscPsychological ExplanationReasons and CausesCausal Theory of ActionFrench …Read more
    Explanation of Action, MiscPsychological ExplanationReasons and CausesCausal Theory of ActionFrench Philosophy
  •  112
    Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionality
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 757-758. 1987.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceAspects of Consciousness
  •  601
    Intentionality and the non-psychological
    with C. B. Martin
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 531-54. 1986.
    IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.
    Naturalism and IntentionalityIntentionality, MiscMetaphysics
  •  6527
    On Bullshit Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)
    Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.
    According to Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshitting and lying necessarily differ in intention. I argue contra Frankfurt that (i) bullshitting can be lying, and that (ii) bullshitting need involve neither misrepresentation nor intention to deceive. My discussion suggests that bullshit is not capturable by a simple formula and that, although illuminating, Frankfurt’s analysis is limited to one paradigm.
    Other Academic Areas, MiscSociologyPhilosophy, MiscellaneousLiteratureValue Theory, MiscArts and Hum…Read more
    Other Academic Areas, MiscSociologyPhilosophy, MiscellaneousLiteratureValue Theory, MiscArts and Humanities, Misc
  •  85
    Chisholm on expressions for intentional relations
    Philosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.
    THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
    Roderick ChisholmMetaphysics, MiscellaneousIntentionality, Misc
  •  152
    A problem of motivation for multipliers
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 209-224. 1982.
    GOLDMAN HAS RAISED THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS AGAINST DAVIDSON'S UNIFYING APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS AND EVENTS. THESE OBJECTIONS—A CAUSAL OBJECTION, A RELATIONAL OBJECTION, AND A TEMPORAL OBJECTION—ARE TAKEN AS MOTIVATION FOR HIS OWN MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT IS ITSELF NOT ADEQUATE TO THESE OBJECTIONS.
    Specific Agentive PhenomenaAction Theory, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Action, MiscExplanation of Acti…Read more
    Specific Agentive PhenomenaAction Theory, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Action, MiscExplanation of Action, Misc
  •  486
    Taking Laughter Seriously (review)
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (1). 1984.
    Humour
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