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110Review of 'The Unity of Consciousness', by Tim Bayne (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 599-602. 2012.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
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211Making consciousness safe for neuroscienceIn Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 397. 2005.
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34Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 89-109. 2006.
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9Jackendoff on consciousnessPragmatics and Cognition 4 (1): 81-92. 1996.In "How language helps us think", Jackendoff explores some of the relationships between language, consciousness, and thought, with a foray into attention and focus. In this paper, we will concentrate on his treatment of consciousness. We will examine three aspects of it: I. the method he uses to arrive at his views; 2. the extent to which he offers us a theory of consciousness adequate to assess his views; and 3. some of the things that we might need to add to what he offers to achieve an adequa…Read more
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31Fodor's New Theory of Content and ComputationMind and Language 12 (3-4): 459-474. 1997.In his recent book, The Elm and the Expert, Fodor attempts to reconcile the computational model of human cognition with informationātheoretic semantics, the view that semantic, and mental, content consists of nothing more than causal or nomic relationships, between words and the world, or (roughly) brain states and the world. In this paper, we do not challenge the project. Nor do we show that Fodor has failed to carry it out. instead, we urge that his analysis, when made explicit, turns out rath…Read more
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39Further routes to psychological constructionismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3): 153-154. 2012.In this commentary, we do two things. First, we sketch two further routes to psychological constructionism. They are complementary to Lindquist et al.'s meta-analyses and have potential to add new evidence. Second, we look at a challenging kind of case for constructionism, namely, emotional anomalies where there are correlated, and probably relevant, brain anomalies. Psychopaths are our example
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104The Appearance of ThingsIn Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett, Cambridge University Press. pp. 41. 2002.
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270Kant, self-awareness, and self-referenceIn Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. pp. 9--30. 2001.
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44Kant's A Priori Methods for Recognizing Necessary TruthsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (sup1): 215-252. 1992.
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4Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 13 (1): 43-45. 1993.
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