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47Judgments and drafts eight years laterIn Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Mit Press. 2000.Now that some years have passed, how does this picture of consciousness look? On the one hand, Dennett's work has vastly expanded the range of options for thinking about conscious experiences and conscious subjects. On the other hand, I suspect that the implications of his picture have been oversold (perhaps more by others than by Dennett himself). The rhetoric of _CE_ is radical in places but I do not sure that the actual implications for commonsense views of Seemings and Subjects are nearly as…Read more
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110Review of 'The Unity of Consciousness', by Tim Bayne (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 599-602. 2012.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
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252Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2005.This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processi…Read more
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209Making consciousness safe for neuroscienceIn Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 397. 2005.
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34Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousnessIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 89-109. 2006.
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9Jackendoff on consciousnessPragmatics and Cognition 4 (1): 81-92. 1996.In "How language helps us think", Jackendoff explores some of the relationships between language, consciousness, and thought, with a foray into attention and focus. In this paper, we will concentrate on his treatment of consciousness. We will examine three aspects of it: I. the method he uses to arrive at his views; 2. the extent to which he offers us a theory of consciousness adequate to assess his views; and 3. some of the things that we might need to add to what he offers to achieve an adequa…Read more
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39Further routes to psychological constructionismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3): 153-154. 2012.In this commentary, we do two things. First, we sketch two further routes to psychological constructionism. They are complementary to Lindquist et al.'s meta-analyses and have potential to add new evidence. Second, we look at a challenging kind of case for constructionism, namely, emotional anomalies where there are correlated, and probably relevant, brain anomalies. Psychopaths are our example
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29Fodor's New Theory of Content and ComputationMind and Language 12 (3-4): 459-474. 1997.In his recent book, The Elm and the Expert, Fodor attempts to reconcile the computational model of human cognition with informationātheoretic semantics, the view that semantic, and mental, content consists of nothing more than causal or nomic relationships, between words and the world, or (roughly) brain states and the world. In this paper, we do not challenge the project. Nor do we show that Fodor has failed to carry it out. instead, we urge that his analysis, when made explicit, turns out rath…Read more
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103The Appearance of ThingsIn Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett, Cambridge University Press. pp. 41. 2002.
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270Kant, self-awareness, and self-referenceIn Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, John Benjamins. pp. 9--30. 2001.
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