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20Philosophical foundations of artificial consciousnessArtificial Intelligence in Medicine 44 (2): 119-137. 2008.replicated by artificial intelligence (AI). The firstpersonal, subjective, what-it-is-like-to-be-something nature of consciousness is thought to be untouchable by the computations, algorithms, processing and functions of AI method. Since AI is the most promising avenue toward artificial consciousness (AC), the conclusion many draw is that AC is..
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19It is argued that standard arguments for the Externalism of mental states do not succeed in the case of pre-linguistic mental states. Further, it is noted that standard arguments for Internalism appeal to the principle that our individuation of mental states should be driven by what states are explanatory in our best cognitive science. This principle is used against the Internalist to reject the necessity of narrow individuation of mental states, even in the prelinguistic case. This is done by s…Read more
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18Connectionism, Cognitive Maps and the Development of ObjectivityAI Review 7 329-354. 1993.It is claimed that there are pre-objective phenomena, which cognitive science should explain by employing the notion of non-conceptual representational content. It is argued that a match between parallel distributed processing (PDP) and non-conceptual content (NCC) not only provides a means of refuting recent criticisms of PDP as a cognitive architecture; it also provides a vehicle for NCC that is required by naturalism. A connectionist cognitive mapping algorithm is used as a case study to exam…Read more
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18The Physical Mandate for Belief-Goal PsychologyMinds and Machines 30 (1): 23-45. 2020.This article describes a heuristic argument for understanding certain physical systems in terms of properties that resemble the beliefs and goals of folk psychology. The argument rests on very simple assumptions. The core of the argument is that predictions about certain events can legitimately be based on assumptions about later events, resembling Aristotelian ‘final causation’; however, more nuanced causal entities must be introduced into these types of explanation in order for them to remain …Read more
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17have context-sensitive constituents, but rather because they sometimes have no constituents at all. The argument to be rejected depends on the assumption that one can only assign propositional contents to representations if one starts by assigning sub-propositional contents to atomic representations. I give some philosophical arguments and present a counterexample to show that this assumption is mistaken.
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10A view from anywhere Prospects for an objective understandingIn Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience, John Benjamins. pp. 37--3. 2001.
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9Non-conceptual Psychological Explanation: Content and ComputationDissertation, Oxford. 1996.2.4 The Example: Infants and object-(im)permanence : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 17 2.4.1 Why a contentful account is warranted: Perspectival sensitivity : : : 17 2.4.2 The \searching under a cloth" and \AB" data : : : : : : : : : : : : 24 2.4.3 Two constraints on objectuality : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 25..
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9This Neurocomputing special issue is based on selected, expanded and significantly revised versions of papers presented at the Second International Conference on Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems (BICS 2006) held at Lesvos, Greece, from 10 to 14 October 2006. The aim of BICS 2006, which followed the very successful first BICS 2004 held at Stirling, Scotland, was to bring together leading scientists and engineers who use analytic, syntactic and computational methods both to understand the prodigious…Read more
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1Artificial Consciousness, Meta-Knowledge, and Physical OmniscienceJournal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 7 (2): 199-215. 2020.Previous work [Chrisley & Sloman, 2016, 2017] has argued that a capacity for certain kinds of meta-knowledge is central to modeling consciousness, especially the recalcitrant aspects of qualia, in computational architectures. After a quick review of that work, this paper presents a novel objection to Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA) against physicalism, an objec- tion in which such meta-knowledge also plays a central role. It is first shown that the KA's supposition of a person, Mary, who…Read more
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The Ontological Status of Computational StatesSchool of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex. 1992.
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The ontological status of computational statesIn Gianfranco Soldati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 1: Philosophy of Mind, Csli Publications. pp. 55-75. 1994.
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Taking Embodiment Seriously Non-Conceptual Content and ComputationSchool of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex. 1992.
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IgorAleksanderThe World in My Mind, My Mind in the World: Key Mechanisms of Consciousness in People, Animals and Machines2005Imprint Academic1 845 40021 6£ 17.95 (UK)/$34.90 (US)(196 pp.) (review)Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1): 5-6. 2006.
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