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38Hintikka on "Prima Facie" ObligationsTheoria 40 (3): 163-165. 1974.In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation
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734Quine and the A PrioriIn Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
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25A note on John R. Searle's derivation of 'ought' from 'is'Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8 (1-4): 309-314. 1965.
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2385Davidsons's Objections to Quine's EmpiricismIn G. Segal P. Pagin P. Kotatko (ed.), Interpreting Davidson, Csli Publications. 2001.
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51Thomas Nagel - Recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, 2008Theoria 75 (2): 76-78. 2009.
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16On the Value of Scientific KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1): 53-63. 1987.Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. Th…Read more
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6888Scientific valueInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology
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16Quine, Empiricism, and TruthIn A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 63--79. 2000.
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15Outline for an Argument for Moral RealismGrazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1): 215-225. 1981.Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a good …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Normative Ethics |