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6952Scientific valueInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology
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16Quine, Empiricism, and TruthIn Alex Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, Kluwer Academic Print On Demand. pp. 63--79. 2000.
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15Outline for an Argument for Moral RealismGrazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1): 215-225. 1981.Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a good …Read more
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59Explanation and interpretation of actionInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 3-15. 1990.Abstract Contrary to what is usually taken for granted, the traditional positivistic and hermeneutic accounts of explanations of human actions do not really contradict one another. There is no logical or epistemological difference between explanations in this area and explanations in the natural sciences. However, if W. V. Quine and D. Davidson are right, there may be an ontological difference between the explanation of natural events and the interpretation of actions
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319Meaning and moralsIn Raymond E. Olson (ed.), Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia, Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972.
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17Interpersonal Utility ComparisonsGrazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1): 283-312. 1982.Utilitarianism, as well as many other political and moral doctrines, presupposes that the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons can be solved. Otto Neurath gave a comparatively early (1912) and explicit statement of this problem, and he suggested that it cannot be solved. This may still be the dominant view. It is argued that recent attempts to solve the problem (by e.g. Schick, Rescher, Harsanyi, Brandt, Jeffrey, Arrow, and Hare) are unsatisfactory, but that the oldest suggestion - i.e. …Read more
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863Underdetermination of Physical TheoryIn Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge University Press. pp. 91--114. 2006.
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101On the Coherence of Act-UtilitarianismAnalysis 33 (3). 1973.The article is a reply to professor castaneda's criticism of a recursive formulation of act-utilitarianism which i have suggested in an earlier paper (analysis 29.2) and which was intended to satisfy the deontic principle that 'ought' is distributable over conjunctions. i argue that castaneda's arguments against my formulation are inconclusive
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53Gary Kemp Quine versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 191 pp. isbn 978‐0‐19‐969562‐1 (review)Theoria 80 (3): 283-287. 2014.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
General Philosophy of Science |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
Normative Ethics |