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Lars Bergström

Stockholm University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    54
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    41

 More details
  • Stockholm University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor Emeritus
Stockholm University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1966
Homepage
Stockholm, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
General Philosophy of Science
Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (54)
  •  12
    Intersubjectivity in Social Science
    Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 14 (1): 153-158. 1977.
  •  17
    Utilitarianism and future mistakes
    Theoria 43 (2): 84-102. 2008.
  •  36
    Reply to Professor Hintikka
    Theoria 41 (2): 84-84. 2008.
  •  4
    Interview with Donald Davidson in November 1993
    with Dagfinn Føllesdal
    Theoria 60 (3): 207-225. 2008.
  • Prawitz's version of verificationism
    Theoria 64 (2‐3): 139-156. 2008.
  •  12
    Comments on Castañeda's semantics of prescriptive discourse
    Theoria 28 (1): 70-72. 2008.
  • Reflections on consequentialism
    Theoria 62 (1‐2): 74-94. 2008.
  •  9
    Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993
    with Dagfinn Føllesdal
    Theoria 60 (3): 193-206. 2008.
  •  7
    Book Reviews (review)
    with Willem B. Drees and Lisa Bortolotti
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1): 109-118. 2009.
  •  22
    Review (review)
    with R. M. Hare
    Theoria 30 (1): 39-49. 1964.
  •  56
    Quine
    In W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
    Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and revised …Read more
    Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and revised the empiricist doctrine in important ways. He has published 20 books and numerous articles, and he is perhaps the most influential analytical philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century.
    W. V. O. Quine
  •  1679
    Quine and the A Priori
    In Gilbert Harman & Ernest Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley-blackwell. 2013.
    John P. Burgess: Quine's continuing struggles with epistemological and ontological problems about mathematics and logic are traced from his first rebellion against logicism, through his flirtation and subsequent disillusionment with nominalism, to his final endorsement of naturalism, with an eye throughout to tensions among different aspects of his overall philosophy.
    W. V. O. QuineNaturalized Epistemology
  • Reasons in ethics
    In Gilbert Ryle (ed.), Contemporary aspects of philosophy, Oriel Press. pp. 177. 1977.
    Ethics
  •  81
    Paul A. Gregory: Quine's Naturalism: Language, Theory, and the Knowing Subject
  •  49
    Quine versus Davidson : Truth, Reference and Meaning by Gary Kemp
  •  337
    Utilitarianism and alternative actions
    Noûs 5 (3): 237-252. 1971.
    Utilitarianism
  •  2183
    Quine's relativism
    Theoria 72 (4): 286-298. 2006.
    Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.
    Epistemic Relativism, MiscW. V. O. QuineNaturalized Epistemology
  •  171
    On the formulation and application of utilitarianism
    Noûs 10 (2): 121-144. 1976.
    Utilitarianism
  •  53
    Hintikka on "Prima Facie" Obligations
    Theoria 40 (3): 163-165. 1974.
    In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation.
    Ethics
  •  1674
    Underdetermination of Physical Theory
    In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge University Press. pp. 91--114. 2004.
    Naturalized EpistemologyUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Mis…Read more
    Naturalized EpistemologyUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  901
    Notes on the value of science
    In Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science IX: proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991, Elsevier. 1994.
    Value Theory, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  8296
    Scientific value
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.
    Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi‐dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.
    Value Theory, MiscScience and Values
  •  149
    Prawitz's version of verificationism
    Theoria 64 (2-3): 139-156. 1998.
    Verificationist Theories of Meaning
  •  121
    Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993
    with Dagfinn Føllesdal
    Theoria 60 (3): 193-206. 1994.
    W. V. O. Quine
  •  102
    Comments on Castañeda's semantics of prescriptive discourse
    Theoria 28 (1): 70-72. 1962.
    Moral Language, Misc
  •  190
    Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic
    Analysis 29 (2): 43-44. 1968.
    Normative Ethics, Misc
  •  11236
    Death and Eternal Recurrence
    In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Global Metaphysical Theories, MiscDeath and Dying, Misc
  •  425
    Quine, Underdetermination, and Skepticism
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (7): 331-358. 1993.
    W. V. O. QuineUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscInductive SkepticismQuine-Duhem Thesis
  •  179
    On the Value of Scientific Knowledge
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 30 (1): 53-63. 1987.
    Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. Th…Read more
    Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. The main counter-argument is that the doctrine has implications which are morally unacceptable.
    Epistemic ValueApplied Ethics, Miscellaneous
  •  148
    Imperatives and contradiction
    Mind 79 (315): 421-424. 1970.
    Moral Language, Misc
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