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Lars Bergström

Stockholm University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    54
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    41

 More details
  • Stockholm University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor Emeritus
Stockholm University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1966
Homepage
Stockholm, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
General Philosophy of Science
Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Normative Ethics
  • All publications (54)
  •  2
    Alternatives and utilitarianism
    Theoria 34 (2): 162. 1968.
    Utilitarianism, Misc
  •  157
    Thomas Nagel - Recipient of the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, 2008
    Theoria 75 (2): 76-78. 2009.
    No Abstract.
    20th Century Analytic Philosophy, MiscAreas of Mathematics
  • Quine on underdetermination
    In Robert B. Barrett & Roger F. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine, Blackwell. pp. 38--52. 1990.
    W. V. O. QuineUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, Misc
  •  213
    On the Coherence of Act-Utilitarianism
    Analysis 33 (3): 98-102. 1973.
    The article is a reply to professor castaneda's criticism of a recursive formulation of act-utilitarianism which i have suggested in an earlier paper (analysis 29.2) and which was intended to satisfy the deontic principle that 'ought' is distributable over conjunctions. i argue that castaneda's arguments against my formulation are inconclusive.
    Utilitarianism
  •  105
    Gary Kemp Quine versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 191 pp. isbn 978‐0‐19‐969562‐1 (review)
    Theoria 80 (3): 283-287. 2014.
  •  151
    Underdetermination and realism
    Erkenntnis 21 (3): 349-365. 1984.
    Underdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscQuine-Duhem Thesis
  •  669
    Meaning and morals
    In Raymond E. Olson (ed.), Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia, Johns Hopkins University Press. 1972.
    Moral Principles, Misc
  •  98
    Reply to Professor Hintikka
    Theoria 41 (2): 84-84. 1975.
    Moral Language, Misc
  •  8488
    Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2): 117-129. 2002.
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
    Moral Normativity, Misc
  •  129
    Interview with Donald Davidson in November 1993
    with Dagfinn Føllesdal
    Theoria 60 (3): 207-225. 1994.
    Donald Davidson
  •  70
    First page preview
    with James W. McAllister, James Robert Brown, Martin Carrier, Nancy Cartwright, Jiwei Ci, David Davies, Catherine Elgin, Márta Fehér, and Michel Ghins
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4). 2010.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsThe Contents of Perception, Misc
  •  190
    A Defense of Quinean Naturalism
    In Chase B. Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson, Peter Lang Publishing Group. 2008.
    This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, …Read more
    This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, in particular, epistemology is not a normative discipline. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Quinean naturalism provides an answer to Cartesian scepticism.
    Naturalized Epistemology
  •  337
    Utilitarianism and alternative actions
    Noûs 5 (3): 237-252. 1971.
    Utilitarianism
  •  2183
    Quine's relativism
    Theoria 72 (4): 286-298. 2006.
    Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.
    Epistemic Relativism, MiscW. V. O. QuineNaturalized Epistemology
  •  171
    On the formulation and application of utilitarianism
    Noûs 10 (2): 121-144. 1976.
    Utilitarianism
  •  53
    Hintikka on "Prima Facie" Obligations
    Theoria 40 (3): 163-165. 1974.
    In this note it is argued that professor jaakko hintikka's explication of the notion of a 'prima facie obligation' within the framework of deontic logic must be regarded as unsatisfactory. since our world is not morally (or 'deontically') perfect, hintikka's proposal seems to have the absurd consequence that everything is a prima facie obligation.
    Ethics
  •  1674
    Underdetermination of Physical Theory
    In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge University Press. pp. 91--114. 2004.
    Naturalized EpistemologyUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Mis…Read more
    Naturalized EpistemologyUnderdetermination of Theory by Data, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  901
    Notes on the value of science
    In Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, methodology, and philosophy of science IX: proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991, Elsevier. 1994.
    Value Theory, MiscGeneral Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  8296
    Scientific value
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3): 189-202. 1996.
    Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi‐dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.
    Value Theory, MiscScience and Values
  •  149
    Prawitz's version of verificationism
    Theoria 64 (2-3): 139-156. 1998.
    Verificationist Theories of Meaning
  •  121
    Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993
    with Dagfinn Føllesdal
    Theoria 60 (3): 193-206. 1994.
    W. V. O. Quine
  •  102
    Comments on Castañeda's semantics of prescriptive discourse
    Theoria 28 (1): 70-72. 1962.
    Moral Language, Misc
  •  190
    Utilitarianism and Deontic Logic
    Analysis 29 (2): 43-44. 1968.
    Normative Ethics, Misc
  •  11236
    Death and Eternal Recurrence
    In Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Global Metaphysical Theories, MiscDeath and Dying, Misc
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