Mike McNamee

This chapter discusses the role conflict of the educational researcher who comes upon an unprofessional relationship between teacher and pupil. It is argued that the whistleblowing literature in related professions, with its focus on standard conditions and solutions framed as obligations, is inadequate. Reference is made to the idea of ‘guilty knowledge’: the feelings of guilt that attach when one comes to know of harm visited on innocent others, and has no unqualified sense of which way to act. Distinguishing moral from causal responsibility helps to show how blame need not necessarily attach to the guilt-ridden researcher, whichever option she chooses.

"The ethics of sports medicine is an important emerging area within biomedical ethics. The professionalisation of medical support services in sport and continuing debates around issues such as performance-enhancing technologies or the health and welfare of athletes mean that all practitioners in sport, as well as researchers with an interest in sports ethics, need to develop a clear understanding of the ethical aspects of the sport-medicine nexus. In this timely collection of articles, sports ethicist Mike McNamee and other leading international scholars explore the conceptual and practical issues that shape and define ethics in sports medicine. Examining central topics such as consent, confidentiality, pain, doping and genetic technology, this book establishes an important baseline for future academic and professional work in this area. "--

The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of Schadenfreude - the pleasure felt at another’s misfortune - and to argue that feeling it in the course of health care work, as elsewhere, is evidence of a deficient character. In order to show that Schadenfreude is an objectionable emotion in health care work, I first offer some conceptual remarks about emotions generally and their differential treatment in Kantian and Aristotelian thought. Second, I argue that an appreciation of the rationality of the emotions is crucial to our self-understanding as persons in general and nurses in particular. Third, I present a critique of Portmann’s (2000, When Bad Things Happen to Other People. London: Routledge) defence of Schadenfreude with examples from both nursing and medical scenarios. Specifically, I show how his exculpation of the emotion in terms of low self-esteem and a commitment to justice are not compelling. I argue that we are active in the construction of our emotional experiences of Schadenfreude, how we may indeed ‘nurse’ the emotion, and thus become culpable for them in ethical terms