Otto Lehto

Michel Foucault famously refused to formulate a normative theory of the state, arguing instead that political analysis must "cut off the King's head." This chapter explores Foucault’s relevance to the question of state legitimacy by tracing his analytical shift from the dispersed micro-physics of disciplinary power to the macro-logic of governmentality. This Foucauldian view challenges hierarchical conceptions of state power in three key ways: it reveals governmentality as a decentralised network rather than a central command; it exposes power as productive of subjects rather than merely oppressive; and it locates counter-power in the interstices of the social order, suggesting that resistance takes diverse forms beyond the traditional revolutionary capture of the state; a kind of “infrapolitics” that operates in the shadows of official power (Scott, 2009). To illustrate these insights, the chapter outlines Foucault's "triangle of power"—Sovereignty, Discipline, and Government (especially in the form of Security/Biopolitics)—showing how the modern state justifies itself. The chapter concludes by examining Foucault’s Kantian-Nietzschean "critical attitude," arguing that his genealogical method offers a distinct mode of normative critique. By exposing the historical contingency of state rationality, Foucault provides a toolkit for counter-conduct: the critical and ethical practice of resisting the specific ways in which we are governed.

In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick defends a libertarian theory of property rights under a minimal state. Whether libertarian theory supports or excludes intellectual property (IP) rights remains controversial. This paper shows that, although Nozick only mentions intellectual property (IP) a few times in the book, these discussions turn out to be surprisingly pivotal for his arguments. Indeed, Nozick calls IP rights a “fundamental” issue for libertarian theory. So, it is important to analyse the structural, methodological, and substantive implications of what Nozick says (and does not say) about IP rights. I will show that, in Part 1 of ASU, IP rights illustrate the non-ideal problems of persistent libertarian disagreement and deep value pluralism that libertarian protective associations need to come to terms with (whether through battle or reconciliation). In Part 2 of ASU, Nozick discusses patents to illustrate the limits of the Lockean Proviso. His embrace of counterfactual reasoning opens the surprising possibility that even property rights in physical resources may be up for time limitations, inheritance laws, or other rectifying regulations. Overall, Nozick’s discussion of IP rights illuminates the somewhat neglected role of non-ideal libertarian theory, epistemic indeterminacy, counterfactual reasoning, and the role of pragmatic, “rule-of-thumb” remedies in Nozick’s theory. In the final analysis, Nozick does not develop a fully coherent picture of IP rights, and his proposed solution, putting time limits on patents, seems somewhat ad hoc. Although IP rights play an underappreciated role in the book, his discussion raises more questions than it answers. The Nozickian answer is that the epistemically humble libertarian (or liberal) has to approach the regulation of IP rights, and other thorny issues of real-world property-ownership, with an open mind.

This paper examines the challenges behavioural public policy faces in reconciling its interventions with liberal principles, as illustrated by Adam Oliver’s concept of “budging.” While “nudging,” a prominent application, aims to steer individuals towards better choices using subtle “choice architecture” tweaks, it has been criticized for its paternalism and potential for manipulation. As a purportedly non-paternalistic alternative, Adam Oliver proposed “budging,” which shifts the focus from the individual to regulating third parties (especially market actors) that exploit known cognitive biases for profit. Oliver argues budging aligns with John Stuart Mill’s harm principle by preventing harm caused by others, specifically “behavioural externalities,” without dictating personal choices. This paper critically evaluates budging’s claim to non-paternalistic legitimacy within a Millian liberal framework, incorporating insights from Feinberg and Raz. It argues that budging often fails to escape paternalism, frequently becoming a form of ‘crypto-paternalism’: interventions justified with the non-paternalistic rationale of preventing third-party harm that nevertheless have the primary effect of steering an individual’s self-regarding choices. The core issue lies in the entanglement of regulating third-party exploitation (externalities) and influencing individual choices potentially affected by biases (internalities). Regulating exploitative practices inevitably steers individuals away from choices deemed suboptimal, which can be interpreted both paternalistically and non-paternalistically. The paper explores challenges related to defining exploitation versus legitimate catering, the difficulty in isolating non-paternalistic justifications, and the potential overlap with existing regulations. Ultimately, it concludes that while budging offers valuable insights, it struggles to cleanly separate itself from paternalism and requires further refinement to be fully compatible with robust liberal principles.

This paper argues that the notion of interstitial transformation, whereby new social practices emerge within the gaps of existing orders and gain prominence, is crucial for understanding social change in a complex world. Our work builds on the contributions of two distinct scholarly groups who have explored social complexity. The first are emancipatory radicals who look to bottom-up interstitial change to achieve radical social change. The second is classical or “Open Society” liberals who wish to leverage interstitial complexity within civil society and the economy against a stable background of liberal rules. This paper brings these distinct literatures into conversation with one another, aiming to reconcile their insights and identify weaknesses in their approaches. We argue that both groups overestimate the feasibility of instrumentalising interstitial complexity for their goals. Using a stylised model of interstitial social struggle, we explore the social dynamics occurring in a world populated by both emancipatory radicals and Open Society liberals. We posit an emergent strategic struggle between emancipatory radicals who use prefigurative strategies to affect the fundamental transformation of the liberal legal order and the Open Society governors who resist them. We stress that the overall result of this struggle will likely exceed the intentions of both parties. Our model should provide valuable insights for socialists, anarchists, radicals, and liberals concerned with social transformation and the robustness of the liberal Open Society.

In the middle of the 20th century, cybernetics became entangled with the socialist and neoliberal transformations in Latin America. Both democratic socialists and market liberals appealed to cybernetic ideas about multi-level decentralization and adaptive control to coordinate society and promote welfare. By analyzing Chile as a case study, we explore the twin experiments of cyber-socialism and neoliberalism rooted in modernism and oscillating between top-down design and partial (constrained) decentralization. We show that the modernist and cybernetic ideas of “designing freedom” influenced the Allende administration (1970-1973) and the Pinochet regime (1973-1990). The former experimented with cyber-socialism through Project Cybersyn and the latter with authoritarian neoliberalism. Focusing on the work of cybernetic scholars Stafford Beer and F.A. Hayek, we compare both regimes’ different but partially overlapping approaches to the design of constrained freedom. Several features of modernist thinking and cybernetics explain both experiments’ appeal and shortcomings. These lessons are relevant for contemporary debates about the future of liberal democracy, the information society, and the compatibility of freedom with artificial intelligence (AI).

In evolutionary liberalism, exemplified by the Hayekian-Gaussian Open Society, a) liberal institutions and norms are explained (in part or wholly) with the help of evolutionary explanations; and b) such evolutionary explanations are assumed to carry normative weight in justifying liberalism. This paper argues that evolutionary liberalism is a methodologically and normatively appealing version of liberalism. The beneficial aspects of the Open Society can be cashed out, not merely in terms of complex adaptation, but also in terms of (collective) intelligence. The salutary epistemic properties of liberalism thus relate to its purported capacity to boost collective intelligence - or, what comes to the same thing, its general-purpose, open-ended problem solving capacity. A deeper methodological integration of the theories of evolution, complexity, and intelligence promises to increase the broad normative appeal of liberal institutions as efficient, general-purpose “problem solvers.”

The narrow conception of justice traditionally attributed to Hume limits itself to respect for the rules of property. This article challenges the increasingly common idea that this view is exceedingly narrow and unsatisfactory. We address this “Humean Problem of Justice” (hpj) in three steps. First, we consider a recent argument that Hume’s theory is, in fact, broader than usually acknowledged. In doing so, we identify four conceptions of justice that appear in Hume’s political writings. Despite the polysemy, we show that the narrow conception is, indeed, Hume’s core conception on plausible textual grounds. Second, we identify the philosophical reasons, internal to Hume’s political theory, that explain Hume’s preference for the narrow conception. Finally, we find that these philosophical reasons demonstrate the continued importance of Hume’s narrow conception of justice. Hume’s approach, we argue, merits reconsideration due to its surprising relevance to a society characterized by dynamism and diversity.

In Explaining Technology, Koppl et al. (2023) argue that “recombination is the essential driver of technological evolution” (p. 3). Modelling combinatorial innovation as a self-propelling, “autocatalytic” process raises the question of what explanatory role, if any, is left for institutional analysis. Although the authors grant institutions only an auxiliary explanatory role, they hint at the functional importance of market institutions, trade networks, patent law, and entrepreneurship. Our paper argues that institutions matter because they crucially affect aggregate levels and rates of recombination and innovation, as well as shaping patterns of recombination and innovation that occur. This paper builds upon Koppl et al.’s acknowledgement of these institutional effects by integrating combinatorial evolution within recent developments in commons theory and institutional economics. Specifically, we argue the burgeoning literature on Governing Knowledge Commons offers a fruitful framework and body of empirical case studies that illuminates the diverse institutions individuals use to facilitate and steer combinatorial innovation. Whilst healthy institutional diversity may incentivize more recombination than any single monocentric institutional arrangement, the non-teleological aspect of recombination means that innovative processes can exude either productive, unproductive, or destructive effects. The institutional diversity fostered by flourishing knowledge commons may allow people to put combinatorial innovations into more productive uses while internalizing their complex externalities. At the same time, it may generate socio-cultural resistances to some forms of innovation processes. We illustrate our theory using cases related to several applied topics including intellectual property, competition policy, and the development of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Classical liberals have a long and convoluted history with the welfare state. Welfare policy has engaged liberals ever since the debates round poor relief, land ownership, and distributive justice in authors like John Locke, Thomas Paine, Herbert Spencer, and Henry George. However, the majority of the welfare state debate, from David Hume and Adam Smith to Milton Friedman and Richard Epstein, has been conducted primarily on the basis of rule-consequentialist reasoning, weighing the expected (long-term) costs and benefits of different institutional rules. Classical liberals tend to be primarily concerned with welfare in the “happiness of individuals” sense and only secondarily with welfare in the “government handout” sense. This necessitates an investigation into the expected benefits and costs of various institutional rules and social policies. As a result, any disagreements about the best institutional pathway forward must be settled through comparative institutional analysis. Today, it seems to me that the classical liberal perspective must choose between two alternative pathways, each of which has its pros and cons, and each of which seems compatible with the abstract and general rules of the market society: 1) The Minimally Redistributive State based on a classical liberal constitution supported by robust market institutions and a civil society mosaic of polycentric mutual aid networks; or 2) The Welfare State of Law which, in addition to all of the above, adds a few carefully rule-bound and market-conforming redistributive mechanisms, the most important of which is the robust guarantee of something like a conditional minimum income scheme or an unconditional UBI/NIT scheme. In addition, the 3) “Third Way” models of the Social Market Economy and the Free Market Welfare State are also sometimes included as a third option.

*Taxation in Utopia" by Donald Morris makes a valuable contribution to social theory. It offers new taxonomies of actual and potential social schemes according to their diabolically creative sacrificial impositions. Perhaps the main reason to celebrate Morris’s contribution is its ability to provide insightful parallels between pecuniary and nonpecuniary “required sacrifices.” Utopian literature is rife with—indeed inseparable from—demands of sacrifice for the sake of the collective good. Morris reminds us that the full cost of Utopian schemes is measured not in monetary value alone, but in the loss of freedoms, dignity, privacy, autonomy, etc. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis should also take full account of the positive side of the Utopian social calculus. It is not enough to condemn the sacrifices; one also needs to appraise the positive achievements.

Why humanism, still/again? The very same question was asked – not for the first time, nor for the last – by Sartre, in a rhetorical mood, in his 1946 landmark treatise, L’existentialisme est un humanisme, a work which propounded many of the topics and doctrines that were to become the core of the new French existentialist movement in philosophy and literature. In differentiating “his” philosophy from the other humanist traditions of the time – from those allied with it, like Marxism, to those hostile to it, like Christianity – he chose to define “existentialist” humanism as radically distinct from “essentialist” or “classical” humanism (basically everything pre-Sartre or pre-Existentialism). Humanism he defined as “une theorie qui prend l’homme comme fin et comme valeur supérieure." In his reading of history, this pre-existentialist humanism of his forebears, as represented by Enlightenment’s offspring, unduly emphasized such things as “human nature”, “human rights” (god-given or natural) and social law-likeness – all essentialist, anti-individualistic theories of the human condition. Existentialism wanted to strip away the last vestiges of any essentialist salvaging of the absoluteness of Man’s condition: “l’homme est libre, l’homme est liberté”; “Nous sommes seuls, sans excuses … l’homme est condamné à être libre." Instead of history or the social condition being the sculptor of man, it is man himself who is the author of his own destiny and of the course of history. This open up possibilities of progress but also temptations of hubris and disaster.

In his influential 1949 essay, The Intellectuals and Socialism, F.A. Hayek prophesied that the “revival of liberalism” must coincide with the resurgence of “the courage to be Utopian.” Today, at a time when liberalism is under attack from multiple fronts, we need courage more than ever. Indeed, the rediscovery of the Utopian potential of liberalism coincides with going back to its roots. My paper shows that liberalism, especially in its so-called “epistemic” or "evolutionary" branch whose notable theorists include Adam Smith, J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and F.A. Hayek, provides a framework for “real Utopian” theory and practice. However, I argue that evolutionary liberalism should be enriched with the insights of contemporary evolutionary theory and complexity theory to properly account for the downsides of social evolution and to overcome the understandable charge of social Darwinism. Only then can it robustly realise its emancipatory aspirations and real Utopian promise.

The Finnish experiment of 2017–18 is a crucial test case. It provides one of the most robust experimental tests of a universal basic income (UBI) in the context of an advanced industrialised society. And it is a real milestone, since it represents a nonutopian approach to UBI that can be palatable to middle class voters. But its partial success is also a partial failure. Although it is too early to render judgement, the Finnish case shows that there are many obstacles for the successful implementation of theoretical models. Experiments often fall short of the ideal experimental conditions. This speaks against taking too optimistic a view on the next steps.

Tämä artikkeli esittelee utilitaristisen valistusliberalismin käsityksen sananvapaudesta. Sen perusväite on, että tiedonhaluinen, kehittyvä ja demokraattinen yhteiskunta hyötyy pitkällä tähtäimellä enemmän laajan sananvapauden sallimisesta kuin sen maltillisestakin rajoittamisesta. Tämän näkökulman mukaan haitallisen puheen – kuten vihapuheen ja muun loukkaavan puheen – tukahduttaminen on epätoivottavaa mutta tilannekohtaisesti hyötylaskelmien mukaan perusteltavissa, jos laajan sananvapauden pitkän tähtäimen hyödyt on otettu riittävästi huomioon. Ongelma onkin siinä, että näitä pitkän tähtäimen hyötyjä ei yleensä ole otettu riittävästi huomioon. Sananvapauden haitat ovat kiistattomia, joten sananvapauden uskottavan puolustuksen tulee lähteä tämän todellisuuden hyväksymisestä. Sen tulee tarjota uskottava teoreettinen vaihtoehto houkutteleville valtiollisille ratkaisuille, kuten kohdennetulle vihapuhelainsäädännölle. Väitän, että radikaalin valistusliberalismin esittämä laajan sananvapauden malli tarjoaa tällaisen vaihtoehdon.

The complexity approach to political economy suggests that radical uncertainty is a necessary feature of a complex and evolving socioeconomic landscape. Radical uncertainty raises various adaptive challenges that are likely to escalate in the coming decades under the “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” It jeopardizes the wellbeing of ordinary citizens, whose welfare prospects, job opportunities, and income stream are rendered insecure. It also renders precarious the robust implementation of universal human rights, including the right to social security. In fact, it will be argued that human rights cannot be institutionally secured unless they are implemented in a “complexity aware” way that takes account of the uncertainty of the socioeconomic order. In particular, in order to better protect the dignity of rights holders, and to allow them to survive and thrive in the face of radical uncertainty, governments ought to explore various institutional alternatives to existing schemes. It will be suggested that most existing conditional welfare policies systematically fall short of complexity-aware institutional implementation to the extent that they rely on unreasonable assumptions regarding the availability of salient technocratic control over the complex socioeconomic order. Some economists and philosophers have suggested that UBI (Universal Basic Income) might be a viable way to implement the right to social security today. I propose that some of UBI’s most ethically and economically controversial features, such as unconditionality and universality, appear relatively appealing in light of the complexity perspective. In the absence of better alternatives, UBI might even be a requirement of a robust implementation of the human right to social security – a right that welfare states are already committed to on the level of ideal theory but predictably fail to respect in practice due to policy incoherence. However, open questions remain about whether UBI can be transformed from an ideal model into a pragmatic policy.

The classical liberal paradigm has always argued for strong economic freedom combined with limits on government power. But it has also been always openminded about using government programs to improve the society. These principles, if applied to today’s society, are simultaneously a criticism of “really existing” welfare state ideology – with its lack of economic freedom and its reliance on the expansive bureaucracy – but also an opportunity for reforming welfare states toward more freedom-based alternatives. There is a utopian potential in classical liberalism. This book articulates how several strands of liberalism, including Austrian school liberalism and Chicago school liberalism, may support something like universal basic income (UBI).

Karl Widerquist is one of the world’s leading theorists and proponents of Universal Basic Income (UBI). His argument for UBI, however, is only one important cornerstone of his broader theory of justice and freedom. This theory entails a critical reassessment of the justification and proper scope of property rights. This is the task of The Problem of Property, a nifty little book which originates in previously unpublished parts of his doctoral thesis—the same thesis that formed the foundation of his Independence, Propertylessness, and Basic Income: Freedom as the Power to Say No (2013, New York: Palgrave MacMillan). The current book is thus a welcome companion piece to that magnum opus. At the same time, The Problem of Property, thanks to its brevity and clarity, is a decent standalone introduction to Widerquist’s philosophy. While some fans of his previous works might be disappointed that UBI takes an unexpected backseat, the book’s narrow critical focus on the normative justifications of property rights makes it a goldmine for political philosophers. Even Lockean right-libertarians, his ostensible main targets, should find its freedom-based arguments familiar and easy to grasp, even if they may be puzzled by some of the radical conclusions that he draws from them.

Was Foucault a neoliberal? This book may not settle the debate, but it marks a pivotal moment in scholarship. Situating Foucault in the liberalizing, anti-statist, and anti-Communist moments in European and U.S. history, and placing him on the French “Second Left,” opens up new horizons of thought. It forces progressives and socialists to tackle with the complex legacy of Foucault. They can either go along with Foucault to critically explore the productive and emancipatory side of neoliberalism or else bemoan his (however incomplete) “neoliberal turn.” Scholars should pursue further synergistic connections between the Foucauldian and neoliberal analyses of emancipation, experimentalism, decentralized “power-knowledge,” and agential self-creation. And new questions should be asked: “Are our old conceptual tools and ideological categories ill-equipped to tackle the novel challenges of 21st century emancipatory politics? What does it mean to rethink social emancipation, beyond the hegemonic left-right mapping, after Foucault?” Dean & Zamora’s book, aside from being an informative, provocative, and fun read, prompts many questions and challenges us – in one of Foucault’s favourite phrases – to think and act differently.

My paper proposes a tentative framework of bio-existential semiotics based on a reading of Peirce, Darwin, Heidegger, Tarasti, and others. According to this view, there is an evolutionary continuum to life. Human beings are natural organisms and they exhibit many similar bio-existential phenomena. Natural evolution also produces the anthropological, societal and global semiotic processes that constitute cultural evolution as an outgrowth. In the bio-existential perspective, the world is composed of imperfect systems and imperfect consciousnesses where every lifeform must struggle for its existence. Every “Dasein” must face the fact that it must die because it cannot comprehend or control the universe in its totality. This is why life and existence are “tragic” phenomena. Every bio-existential Dasein is a partial comprehension of the universe, and the only way the universe can comprehend itself is through these partial perspectives, which are born to imperfection and die in imperfection, but whose imperfection is of the essence of the universe. This is why bio-existentialism makes for a “tragic” perspective: we are mortals, and all mortals must die. Nonetheless, there is also hope and optimism in this view of life. In conceiving of existence as having certain universal principles that extend from biology to sociology, semioticians and philosophers can formulate new ways of looking at the world. Together with scientists and artists, they can hopefully work towards a better – or at least more refined – ethical attitude towards science, nature and society.

How can libertarianism—which is thought to be hostile to any redistribution—support universal, unconditional cash transfers in the form of a Basic Income? Surprisingly, many vocal proponents of programmes similar to Basic Income—such as economist Milton Friedman, public intellectual Charles Murray, and eBay co-founder Pierre Omidiyar—are self-described libertarians. As this chapter demonstrates, these and other libertarian proponents are not deviating from libertarian thought: instead, they reflect the nuance and diversity of its theoretical foundations. To that end, this chapter explores several justifications for a Basic Income grounded in libertarianism. By libertarianism, we mean a family of theories that emphasize the right of the individual to be free from coercion, a strong respect for private property rights and the free market, and a presumption that market distributions are just and should be disturbed only in limited circumstances. We argue that each variant of libertarianism justifies, but does not mandate, redistribution, although for differing reasons and at different levels. Because this conclusion runs counter to most readers’ impressions of libertarianism, this chapter focuses on making the libertarian case for redistribution. We further show that once one accepts the case for redistribution, providing such redistribution through unrestricted, unconditional cash transfers best reflects core libertarian principles.

What does effective poverty relief entail? How are we to assess the capacity of advanced industrialized societies to solve the problem of poverty? What role, if any, is left for the welfare state? This chapter argues that poverty relief, far from being primarily a matter of post hoc redistribution, primarily consists in a Hayekian-Schumpeterian discovery (or innovation) procedure whereby the problems of the poor are continuously discovered, identified, and eventually solved from the bottom up. This suggests new avenues for reform. I argue, from the point of view of complexity theory, that governments must overcome knowledge and governance problems that limit their competence in the realm of solving the problems of the poor. As a result, any efficient system of poverty relief is unlikely to emerge from imposing an efficient and equitable top-down delivery of given goods and services based on established practices or preferences. The knowledge of what goods and services are required, and what practices should be modified to produce them, is not given to policy makers; it needs to be discovered. And this discovery is best modeled as an entrepreneurial, inquisitive, and experimental process. This process is best understood by applying complexity theory and the Austrian (Hayekian) epistemic paradigm.

Liberal-minded basic income scholars often argue that UBI has two key properties that work together to justify it. Let us call these the freedom justification and the narrative justification. On the one hand, UBI is defended because it gives people more freedom to do what they want to do. (Stigler, 1946, Friedman, 1962; Van Parijs, 1995; Widerquist, 2013) They exhibit primary concern for the purely formal properties of the regime of liberal neutrality. On the other hand, many scholars, including many of the same liberal scholars, argue that UBI also pushes society substantively towards desirable social outcomes. They combine the freedom justification with substantive predictions and expectations. (Rifkin, 1995; Murray, 2016; Weeks, 2020) However, I show that both existentialist philosophy (Sartre) and complexity theory (Knight, Hayek, Schumpeter) suggest that a liberal social order is compatible, at best, with rough pattern prediction about a multiply realizable future that remains narratively open to multiple possible trajectories. Liberal neutrality, to the extent that it nourishes radical freedom, is incompatible with strong, stable narrative predictions. As Nozick put, it “liberty upsets patterns”. This is true of all liberal UBI models, and liberal institutions in general.

This article analyses the phenomenology and ontology of videogames through the lens of semiotics. The difference between games and more traditional narrative models (such as those found in books and movies) lies on the structural level. The game narrative needs to be ‘written’ (played) before it can be ‘read’ (interpreted). Games provide fluidity of interactive immersion: the interface as the place of the merger between the player and the game. A connection, without delay, is established between the movement of the player’s hands and the virtual movement across virtual space-times of the virtual characters/events on the screen. The connection is cybernetic, of course, and real. The actuality of the virtual is established as the action of the finger movements of the player. Games require at least a minimum degree of interaction. The player has a role as the master of the code, as the last string of code attached to complete the sequence. Such is the definition of the Cinematic under the formal demands of the Ludic: the defining-delimiting-restricting background which nonetheless, by its very (fixed) presence, provides the nurturing ground for the appearance and presence of (fluid) malleability as the ‘gap’ or ‘lack’ in the structure to be filled – in whatever manner – by the player in the act of his or her (world-constitutive) existential engagement.

Reconciling the many “faces” of Peirce – the Scientist, Philosopher, and Metaphysician - helps to make sense of the open-endedness and versatility of semiotics. Semiosis, for Peirce, knows no rigid hermeneutic or disciplinary bounds. It thus forces us to be open to interdisciplinary and holistic inquiries. The pragmatic maxim sets limits on metaphysical speculation, but it also legitimates the extension of the experimentalist method into cosmological, metaphysical, and even religious domains. Although Peirce's religious speculations are ultimately unsatisfactory, understanding why Peirce expanded his thinking to such domains reveals the expansionist logic of Peircean semiotics beyond the mere idiosyncracies of the man. The triadic, dynamic logic of pragmatist inquiry seeks to expand to all social processes of fixing belief and forming habits, however quixotic; but it remains dubious whether such expansion can fully comport to the scientific, experimentalist method that Peirce preferred.

I provide a defence of the classical liberal tradition (from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi) as a blueprint for a 'bleeding-heart libertarian' framework of society. Such a society defends three principles: 1) Freedom from private coercion (Private Property), 2) Freedom from public coercion (Limited Government); and 3) Within these limits, the provision of a limited range of public goods and public welfare (Limited Welfare State). I show that principles can be abstracted from a reading of the classical liberal tradition. Then, through an extensive analysis of Locke, I show the importance, and consequentialist justifications, of the Three Principles for any liberal welfare state. Through a critique of Nozick, I show the inadequacy of the hardcore libertarian interpretation. Then, I show that John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek have all defended versions of limited welfare states. On this basis, I propose that the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a good example, supported by Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman, of a welfare principle that is compatible with bleeding-heart libertarianism. I believe we can justify, on the basis of a consequentialist theory, that the limited welfare state, which combines welfare with liberty, and the free market with a social safety net, has highly beneficial effects on the society. It thus suggests itself as a viable competitor to rights-based libertarianism and more expansive social liberalism.

I will show that there are mainly two different, mutually contradictory approaches taken by philosophers in trying to answer the question: “Who or what is to blame for the Holocaust?” The first answer, offered by radical critics of Enlightenment (Adorno/Horkheimer, Saul, Heidegger), blames one of the following: Reason, Modernity, the State, Industrial Society, Bureaucratic Management and/or Technocratic Efficiency. On the other side, we have the answer given by liberal-democratic defenders of Enlightenment (Arendt, Habermas, Rawls): It claims the Holocaust was caused the upsurge of anti-rational, irrational or pre-rational forces and a deep rejection of the humanistic principles and ethical values that underpin modernity. In this study, I want to analyze these two perspectives, comparing and contrasting their respective merits.

How is it possible to perform more than is required? And yet, isn’t that precisely what is required, in order for an interlocking society of human beings to function, develop and evolve? If human beings only did what we were told to do, we would live in complete monotony and enslavement. If human beings did only what we were permitted to do, nothing interesting would ever happen. Although performance has often been limited to the study of isolated artistic forms of expressions (music, visual arts, etc.), it is equally possible to analyze culture, on the whole, as a behaviour-encoding system of rules and regulations, wherein the individual actor’s performative appropriation and reinterpretation of these said (cultural, political, artistic) rules makes possible the culture’s very survival, against all odds and obstacles, over long periods of time, as a “tradition” upheld by a community of rule-followers / rule-breakers. Rules, in a very real sense, are meant to be broken. Rule-breaking, by the same token, is, as it were, legislated within the very law code itself, as its own guarantee of immortality. After all, what law could function for any period of time without undergoing reinterpretation? This is good news both for culture and for the avant garde (the creative individual or collective), because even the strictest of rules creates its own conditions of transgression, and vice versa. The performance of culture through the creative freedom of the transgressive individual – i.e. any individual qua his or her individuality – is the sine qua non for a democratic society of peers. Creativity depends upon structure, and structure depends upon that which breaks its shackles of normativity, by rebirthing structure transgressively. The whole point of interpreters is to make things alright for the reappearance of the “father” (the law code) again. Ironically, then, anarchy is the only guarantee of the rule of law.

In a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’— a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the transfer sides of the scheme and was to be implemented as a constitutional rule outside the realm of day-to-day politics. The demogrant has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, but this article locates it in Buchanan’s broader constitutional political economy project and shows it was a logical application of his theoretical framework to the problem of inefficient and unfair welfare systems when reform to the basic institutions of majoritarian democracy was not forthcoming. The demogrant aims to end the problems of majority cycling and rent seeking that plague contemporary welfare states and therefore offers a model of welfare without rent seeking—a constitutional welfare state. We compare Buchanan’s demogrant model to other universal basic income and negative income tax models and consider the most important criticisms. We conclude that rescuing the demogrant model from relative obscurity would be a fruitful future task of applied constitutional political economy and public choice.

In this paper, I assess John McDowell's paper "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" (2009) (AMG) and its theory of epistemological openness to the world. I trace its motivations back to Kantian, Sellarsian and Aristotelean roots. I argue that McDowell subscribes to a kind of Holistic Theory of Rationality (HTR). To explain the HTR, I will analyze the Sellarsian notions of the "Manifest Image," the "Myth of the Given" and the "logical space of reasons." I argue that the holistic nature of McDowell's theory gives it particular properties that put it in need of conservatism, because all the elements of the theory "hang together" - i.e. cohere - in a dangerous fashion. I argue that McDowell cannot afford big changes without upsetting the apple-cart. With this in mind, I shall assess the merits and demerits of AMG, and its modified theory of perceptual content, as an attempted conservative reform of HTR. I want to argue that, taken independently, AMG is a good and important change, but taken holistically it is non-conservative, and disruptive, of the McDowellian picture. Thus, if we wish to proceed with the McDowellian path, we are led to a choice between rejecting the local reform (and retreating back to an earlier version) or demanding further explanations of its global implications.

Intellectual property (IP) can internalize positive externalities associated with the creation and discovery of ideas, thereby increasing investment in efforts to create and discover ideas. However, IP law also causes negative externalities. Strict IP rights raise the transaction costs associated with consuming and building on existing ideas. This causes a tragedy of the anticommons, in which valuable resources are underused and underdeveloped. By disincentivizing creative projects that build on existing ideas, IP protection, even if it increases original innovation, can inadvertently reduce the rate of iterative innovation. The net effect of IP law on innovation and welfare depends on the relative magnitude of these positive and negative externalities. We argue that the current regime probably suffers from excessive, and excessively rigid, IP protection. This motivates the search for institutional alternatives and complements. We suggest that a monocentric IP rights regime may not be the only, or the most efficient, way to internalize the positive externalities of innovation. The knowledge economy supports the emergence of diverse, polycentric forms of bottom-up self-governance, both market and community led, that entail the citizen coproduction of the norms and practices of intellectual creation and discovery.