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81On the Normativity of IntentionsTopoi 33 (1): 87-101. 2014.Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second …Read more
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97David Velleman, the possibility of practical reason (Oxford: Clarendon press, 2000), pp. VIII+302 (review)Utilitas 16 (1): 109-111. 2004.
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80Introduction: Practical reasoning and normativityPhilosophical Explorations 12 (3): 223-225. 2009.This volume brings together previously unpublished papers by leading scholars that deal with the theme of practical reasoning and normativity. The volume includes contributions by Michael Bratman, Donald Bruckner, David Enoch, Elijah Millgram, Andrew Reisner, François and Laura Schroeter, Mark Schroeder, and William White.
Leiden, South Holland, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |