Elodie Giroux

Canguilhem criticized the concept of “public health”: health and disease are concepts that only apply to individuals, taken as organic totalities. Their extension to a different level of organization is purely metaphorical. The importance assumed by epidemiology in the construction of our knowledge of the normal and the pathological does, however, call for reflection on the role and the status of the population level of organization in our approach to health phenomena. The entanglement of the biological and the social in human life and in contemporary societies justifies this level of analysis for better understanding the complexity and the interaction of health determinants both at the level of individuals and their interactions and at that of the population. But is this population level just a useful level of analysis that makes it possible to bring to light the social determinants of health at the individual level, or does it rest instead on characteristics of the population that are irreducible to individual characteristics, but which are nevertheless important for understanding and taking action with respect to both population and individual health? Defending this second alternative, I show how the epidemiological point of view, and in particular that of social epidemiology, leads us to rethink the possibility of a concept of “population health” that is not reducible to the sum of individual instances of health.

English summary: Based on the famous essay by Georges Canguilhem on what is normal and pathological (originally published in 1943), extensive philosophical literature (mainly Anglo-Saxon) has attempted to define these concepts and analyze their status. The main discussion focuses on the following question: can you describe health and illness as natural phenomena or are they states that are determined by values? French text. French description: Depuis le celebre essai de Georges Canguilhem sur le normal et le pathologique publie initialement en 1943 et dont l'un des objectifs etait la clarification des concepts de sante et de maladie, une litterature philosophique abondante, principalement anglo-saxonne, s'est attachee a definir ces concepts et a analyser leur statut. Le principal debat de ce domaine emergent de la philosophie de la medecine porte sur la question: peut-on decrire la sante et la maladie comme des phenomenes naturels ou s'agit-il d'etats qui sont determines par des valeurs? Tous les textes presentes dans ce volume ont participe de cette controverse. Ceux de la premiere section accordent une part importante a la composante biologique. Ceux de la seconde donnent le primat a la notion d'action. Ceux de la derniere section mettent en question l'utilite ou la possibilite meme de definir les deux concepts.

Christopher Boorse's biostatistical theory of health and disease argues that the central discipline on which theoretical medicine relies is physiology. His theory has been much discussed but little has been said about its focus on physiology or, conversely, about the role that other biomedical disciplines may play in establishing a theoretical concept of health. Since at least the 1950s, epidemiology has gained in strength and legitimacy as an independent medical science that contributes to our knowledge of health and disease. Indeed, it not only provides important information about disease distribution and aetiology, but the risk-factor approach it employs seems to challenge BST's binary conception of health and disease. The objective of the article is to show, firstly, how important information deriving from descriptive and analytical epidemiology forms part of our contemporary medical concepts of health and disease, and secondly, that these elements are not taken into account by BST in a satisfactory way. The article's central contention, therefore, is that if the project of defining the theoretical concept of health is to be maintained, more importance should be accorded to the contribution made by epidemiology -- alongside physiology -- in defining health.

In a series of papers published in the 1970s, Christopher Boorse proposed a naturalist theory of health, mainly based on a value-free concept of ‘biological function’, a concept of ‘reference class’ and the notion of ‘statistical normality’. His theory has profoundly shaped the philosophical debates on the concepts of health and disease. It could even be said that the numerous criticisms of his 'biostatistical theory' are at the centre of what is usually referred to as the debate between ‘normativists’ and ‘naturalists’. Today, the predominant naturalist theory of health is still Boorse’s biostatistical theory. This volume offers the first comprehensive review and critical assessment of the nature and status of naturalism in the philosophy of health. It explores the notion of biological normativity and its relevance for the philosophy of health, and it analyses the implications of the philosophical theories of health for healthcare and the debate on health enhancement. In the first section, several contributions identify the kind of ‘naturalism’ the biostatistical theory belongs to and offer further criticisms or possible modifications, such as the concept of function that is required by this theory, and whether a comparativist approach to health is more relevant than a non-comparativist one. The second section explores natural or biological ‘normativity’ and some possible accounts of health that could be based on this concept. The third and final section focuses on the implications of naturalism in healthcare. 'Goals of Medicine’ is the first paper in which Christopher Boorse ventured toward analysing the implication of his biostatistical theory of health on the practice of medicine, the difficult issue of the goals of medicine and the boundary between treating and enhancing. Other papers in this section critically evaluate Boorse’s account and analyse the importance of a positive concept of health.