Hilary Putnam (1981) proposed an interesting and much discussed attempt
to refute a skeptical argument that is based on one form of the brain-in-a-vat
scenario. In turn, Putnam’s attempted refutation is based on content
externalism (also known as semantic externalism). On this view, the
referents and meanings of various types of singular and general terms, as
well as the propositions expressed by sentences containing such terms, are
determined by aspects of the speaker’s external environment. In…
Read moreHilary Putnam (1981) proposed an interesting and much discussed attempt
to refute a skeptical argument that is based on one form of the brain-in-a-vat
scenario. In turn, Putnam’s attempted refutation is based on content
externalism (also known as semantic externalism). On this view, the
referents and meanings of various types of singular and general terms, as
well as the propositions expressed by sentences containing such terms, are
determined by aspects of the speaker’s external environment. In this entry,
we will consider the basic features of and problems with Putnam’s original
argument, and we will also present and discuss several of the most
important attempts to reconstruct or improve upon that argument.