•  17
    Teaching Philosophy with Argumentation Maps: Review of Can Computers Think? The Debate by Robert E. Horn (review)
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 5. 1999.
  • Duchowość a uczciwość intelektualna
    Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 4 (2). 2013.
  •  1371
  •  2013
    Reply to Gallagher: Different conceptions of embodiment
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.
    Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the context…Read more
  •  283
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
  •  3583
    Contemporary philosophical and scienti .c discussions of mind developed from a 'proto-concept of mind ',a mythical,tradition- alistic,animistic and quasi-sensory theory about what it means to have a mind. It can be found in many di .erent cultures and has a semantic core corresponding to the folk-phenomenological notion of a 'soul '.It will be argued that this notion originates in accurate and truthful .rst-person reports about the experiential content of a special neurophenomenological state-cl…Read more
  •  98
    Motor ontology: The representational reality of goals, actions and selves
    with Vittorio Gallese
    Philosophical Psychology 16 (3). 2003.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target …Read more
  •  50
    Was genau ist eigentlich eine Ich-Störung? Ich werde auf den folgenden Seiten dafür argumentieren, daß man die Natur dieses Typs von psychiatrischen Störungsbildern besser verstehen kann, indem man einen Blick über die medizinischen Fachgrenzen hinweg in die analytische Philosophie des Geistes [1] und in die Kognitionswissenschaft [2] wirft. Beiden Disziplinen ist gemeinsam, daß mentale Zustände dort häufig einer funktionalen Analyse unterzogen und als Informationsverarbeitungsereignisse beschri…Read more
  •  173
    Why are identity disorders interesting for philosophers?
    In Thomas Schramme & Johannes Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry, De Gruyter. pp. 311-325. 2003.
    “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content. There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dis…Read more
  •  65
    Das Ziel dieses Beitrags besteht darin, eine kurze Darstellung der "Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivität" (SMT) anzubieten, die sich an naturwissenschaftlich orientierte Leser richtet, die selbst keine Philosophen sind, aber dennoch an philosophischen Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins interessiert sind.
  •  1
    The future of consciousness studies'
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6). 1997.
  •  12
    Reply to Legrand: Content from the Inside Out
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.
    In the current debate, very few people have penetrated as deeply into the self-model theory of subjectivity and have developed such a scholarly expertise on the project as a whole as Dorothée Legrand has done. In the last sentence of her commentary, Legrand alludes to the ugly consequences I have to face after calling the book Being No One: I am suddenly confronted with people from all over the world who are stomping their feet on the ground like stubborn children, claiming that they definitely …Read more
  •  1363
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsectio…Read more
  •  1063
    Precis: Being No-One
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11 1-30. 2005.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundati…Read more
  •  659
    M-Autonomy
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 270-302. 2015.
    What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects …Read more
  •  84
    Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...
  • Funktionalismus, Intentionalität und mentale Modelle
    Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 479. 1992.
  •  542
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures
  •  70
    Der Begriff einer „Bewusstseinskultur“
    In G. Kaiser (ed.), Jahrbuch 2002/2003 des Wissenschaftszentrums Nordrhein-Westfalen, Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-westfalen. 2003.
    Dies ist kein wissenschaftlicher Text im engeren Sinne. Im Gegenteil: Das erste Ziel dieses Beitrags besteht zuerst darin, auf möglichst kurze und allgemeinverständliche Weise eine neue Problemlage zu skizzieren, die mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit an Bedeutung gewinnt. Zweitens möchte ich einen vorläufigen Arbeitsbegriff anbieten, den Begriff einer „Bewusstseinskultur“. Dieser neue Begriff soll dazu dienen, eine Reihe von ganz unterschiedlichen theoretischen und praktischen Strategien zusammenz…Read more
  •  18
    Reply to Hobson: Can there be a First-Person Science of Consciousness?
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.
    Allan Hobson praises and accuses me. He praises me for being empirically informed. And he accuses me of being a “third-person half-some-one”. Specifically, he encourages me to come out of the closet, share some of my own first-person phenomenological experiences, and stop hiding behind neurophenomenological case studies taken from the existing scientific literature. Which I will do, below. But let us first begin with a matter of conceptual controversy.
  •  85
    Open MIND (edited book)
    MIND group. 2015.
    This is an edited collection of 39 original papers and as many commentaries and replies. The target papers and replies were written by senior members of the MIND Group, while all commentaries were written by junior group members. All papers and commentaries have undergone a rigorous process of anonymous peer review, during which the junior members of the MIND Group acted as reviewers. The final versions of all the target articles, commentaries and replies have undergone additional editorial revi…Read more
  • A Philosopher's Nightmare by Jonathan Harrison (review)
    Erkenntnis 29 (1): 143-146. 1988.
  •  23
    conscious content like ``the self in the act of In 1989 the philosopher Colin McGinn asked the knowing'' (see, e.g., chapters 7 and 20 in this following question: ``How can technicolor phe- volume) or high-level phenomenal properties like nomenology arise from soggy gray matter?'' ``coherence'' or ``holism'' (e.g., chapters 8 and 9 (1989: 349). Since then many authors in the ®eld in this volume). But what, precisely, does it mean of consciousness research have quoted this ques- that conscious ex…Read more