Igor Sedlár

We provide a formalization of Aristotelian term negation within an extension of classical first-order logic by two predicate operators. The operators represent the range of application of a predicate and the term negation of a predicate, respectively. We discuss several classes of models for the language characterised by various assumptions concerning the interaction between range of application, term negation and Boolean complementation. We show that the discussed classes can be defined by sets of formulas. In our intended class of models, term negation of P corresponds to the complement of P relative to the range of application of P. It is an established fact about term negation that it does not satisfy the principle of Conversion by Contraposition. This seems to be in conflict with the thesis, put forward by Lenzen and Berto, that contraposition is a minimal requirement for an operator to be a proper negation. We show that the arguments put forward in support of this thesis do not apply to term negation. © 2024 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

We introduce sans serif upper F upper D upper E Subscript c Superscript), an extension of FDE\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {FDE}$$\end{document} with strict implication and a classicality constant, and we show that it formalizes the distinction between explicit and implicit belief. In the style of Levesque’s formalization of these two concepts, explicit beliefs are modelled as sets of formulas closed under our extension of FDE\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathsf {FDE}$$\end{document}, while implicit beliefs form, in a sense, the classical closure of explicit beliefs. We establish an embedding of Levesque’s logic of explicit and implicit belief into sans serif upper F upper D upper E Subscript c Superscript). This result shows that sans serif upper F upper D upper E Subscript c Superscript) is a viable generalization of Levesque’s logic lifting some of its limitations. Unlike a similar generalization introduced by Lakemeyer, sans serif upper F upper D upper E Subscript c Superscript) comes with an Australian-plan semantics and so it is an alternative potentially attractive to those who prefer the Australian plan over the American one.

Epistemic logics based on normal modal logic are notoriously bad at handling inconsistent and yet non-trivial information. This fact motivates epistemic logics based on paraconsistent logic, examples of which can be traced back at least to the 1980s. These logics handle inconsistent and non-trivial information, but they usually do not articulate sources of the inconsistency. Yet, making the origin of an inconsistency present in a body of information explicit is important to assess the body—can we trace the mutually conflicting pieces of information to sources of information relevant to the body or is the inconsistency a result of an error unrelated to any outside sources? Is the inconsistency derived from various equally trustworthy sources or from a single inconsistent source? In this article we show that a paraconsistent modal logic, namely, the logic BK introduced by Odintsov and Wansing, is a first step toward a formalism capable of making these distinctions explicit. We interpret the accessibility relation between states in a model as a source relation—states accessible from a given state are seen as sources of potential justification of the information contained in the original state. This interpretation also motivates the study of a number of extensions of BK. We focus here on extensions of BK able to articulate the relation of compatibility between bodies of information and extensions working with labels explicitly differentiating between bodies of information. In the case of compatibility-based extensions a more detailed technical study including a completeness proof is provided; technical features of the simpler case of label-based extensions, on the other hand, are discussed without going into details.

Since ancient times, philosophers have recognised that truth comes in many 'modes', so that a proposition can be not only true or false, but also, for example, 'necessary' or 'possible'. These ideas led to the modern field of modal logic, a lively area of research at the interface of philosophy, mathematics and computer science. Nowadays, the term 'modal logic' is understood in a broad sense, allowing it to encompass logics for reasoning about seemingly unrelated phenomena such as knowledge, obligations, time, space, and proofs, among many others. Contemporary research in modal logic draws on techniques from many disciplines, including complexity theory, combinatorics, universal algebra, category theory, topology, and proof theory. These proceedings record the papers presented at Advances in Modal Logic 2024, the 15th in a series of biennial conferences that aim to report on important new developments in pure and applied modal logic. Topics in this issue include epistemic modal logic, constructive and many-valued modal logic, unification, alge aic and neighbourhood semantics, proof theory and complexity of modal logics, conditional and quantified modal logic.

We present a neighbourhood-style semantic framework for modal epistemic logic modelling agents who process information using relevant logic. The distinguishing feature of the framework in comparison to relevant modal logic is that the environment the agent is situated in is assumed to be a classical possible world. This framework generates two-layered logics combining classical logic on the propositional level with relevant logic in the scope of modal operators. Our main technical result is a general soundness and completeness theorem.

This book brings together contemporary work on relevant logics to showcase the recent progress of the field and set the stage for future research. The papers in the volume contribute to the formal and philosophical development of the field. They include contributions from different traditions and approaches ranging from philosophical discussions of the foundations of relevant, and related kinds of non-classical, logic to mathematical work concerning open technical problems in the field. This is the first edited collection on the topic in many years, and it includes contributions from established figures as well as younger generations of researchers. Relevant logics have recently seen a resurgence of interest and this volume will be an important resource for logicians working on substructural and relevant logics for years to come.

Fine (J Philos Log 43:549–577, 2014) developed a truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is also called exact semantics, since it is based on a relation of exact verification between states and formulas. A natural question arises as to what are the limits of Fine’s approach and whether an exact semantics of similar kind can be constructed for other important non-classical logics. In our paper, we will generalize Fine’s approach and develop an exact semantics for some substructural logics. In particular, we will provide a truthmaker semantics for the Non-associative Lambek calculus and some of its extensions. This generalization will reveal some interesting connections between Fine’s recent work on truthmaker semantics and his early work on relevant logic.

In this work, we illustrate applications of a semantic framework for non-congruential modal logic based on hyperintensional models. We start by discussing some philosophical ideas behind the approach; in particular, the difference between the set of possible worlds in which a formula is true (its intension) and the semantic content of a formula (its hyperintension), which is captured in a rigorous way in hyperintensional models. Next, we rigorously specify the approach and provide a fundamental completeness theorem. Moreover, we analyse examples of non-congruential systems that can be semantically characterized within this framework in an elegant and modular way. Finally, we compare the proposed framework with some alternatives available in the literature. In the light of the results obtained, we argue that hyperintensional models constitute a basic, general and unifying semantic framework for (non-congruential) modal logic.

Combining relevant and classical modal logic is an approach to overcoming the logical omniscience problem and related issues that goes back at least to Levesque’s well known work in the 1980s. The present authors have recently introduced a variant of Levesque’s framework where explicit beliefs concerning conditional propositions can be formalized. However, our framework did not offer a formalization of implicit belief in addition to explicit belief. In this paper we provide such a formalization. Our main technical result is a modular completeness theorem.

One way to model epistemic states of agents more realistically is to represent these states by sets of situations rather than possible worlds. In this paper we discuss representations of epistemic update in terms of situations. After linking epistemic update based on deleting epistemic accessibility arrows with update of situations, we discuss two specific kinds of public epistemic update; monotonic update in intuitionistic dynamic epistemic logic, and non-monotonic update in substructural dynamic epistemic logic. Our investigation is mainly conceptual, but leads to completeness results using reduction axioms, and lays the groundwork for future investigation into the concept of situated epistemic update.

This article opposes a view widely accepted in studies concerning the history of modal logic, according to which (i) the approach of C. I. Lewis towards constructing modern modal logic was purely syntactical (i.e. limited to the construction of axiomatic systems S1-S5 of propositional modal logic), and (ii) the notion of a possible world was incorporated into modern logic and philosophy mainly by authors such as Rudolf Carnap and Saul Kripke. The article presents Lewis' definition of a possible world, and his formulation of the truth-conditions of statements containing strict implication as their main connective in terms of possible worlds. The main question of the article is whether it is possible to consider Lewis' work in this area as an early stage of the development of possible world semantics, and if so, in what sense? The article concludes by answering affirmatively, due to soundness and completeness proofs with respect to S5 using Lewis' semantics

The article introduces extended models for the propositional dynamic logic PDL. In extended models, valuation assigns to every state a set of atomic formulas and a PDL program. The program is informally construed as an action preferred by a contextually fixed agent. PDL is then extended by introducing a conditional connective expressing partial correctness claims. The main contribution of the article is the observation that the partial correctness conditional is in fact a substructural implication. It is shown that a variant of the minimal distributive substructural logic DB is a fragment of PDLS, an extension of PDL that contains the partial correctness conditional and fusion. It is also shown that the main results can be extended to a specific class of positive substructural logics.

The question, whether there is a sharp difference between an analytic and a synthetic proposition, is one of the famous philosophical topics of the 20th century. The question, however, urges one to ask following questions: "What is an analytic proposition?", or „What is a synthetic proposition?“. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussions of the analyticity in that it tries to answer the first of the two. However, the author does not offer his own conception of analyticity. He rather offers a more detailed view on the definitions and characteristics of an analytic proposition in Kant and Frege

The paper relates evidence and justification logics, both philosophically and technically. On the philosophical side, it is suggested that the difference between the approaches to evidence in the two families of logics can be explained as a result of their focusing on two different notions of support provided by evidence. On the technical side, a justification logic with operators pertaining to both kinds of support is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a special class of awareness models. In addition, a realization theorem with respect to K is shown to hold for the logic.