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148Review of "The Metaphysics of Everday Life" (review)Philosophical Review 118 (4): 533-536. 2009.
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111Compatibilism can resist prepunishment: a reply to SmilanskyAnalysis 68 (3): 250-253. 2008.No Abstract
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112Can a thing be part of itself?American Philosophical Quarterly (1): 87. 2011.Why might someone consider the answer to the titular question to be trivial? Perhaps because she has read some mereology and understands that mereologists distinguish between parthood on the one hand and proper parthood on the other. She understands that, at least when talking in the language of mereology, a thing is necessarily not a proper part of itself, but is necessarily a part of itself. Whether the English word “part” expresses parthood or proper parthood does not seem too important, seei…Read more
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146Responsibility for necessitiesPhilosophical Studies 155 (2): 307-324. 2011.It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples
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1393Weighing ExplanationsIn Andrew Reisner & Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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3166Reasons as EvidenceOxford Studies in Metaethics 4 215-42. 2009.In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present several arguments in favor of our analysis of reason…Read more
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200Epistemicism about vagueness and meta-linguistic safetyPhilosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 277-304. 2008.The paper challenges Williamson’s safety based explanation for why we cannot know the cut-off point of vague expressions. We assume throughout (most of) the paper that Williamson is correct in saying that vague expressions have sharp cut-off points, but we argue that Williamson’s explanation for why we do not and cannot know these cut-off points is unsatisfactory. In sect 2 we present Williamson's position in some detail. In particular, we note that Williamson's explanation relies on taking a pa…Read more
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1527Free Will AgnosticismNoûs 47 (2): 235-252. 2013.I argue that no one knows whether there is free will.
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36Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 208. $65.00Ethics 127 (3): 802-806. 2017.
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