-
3711Tracking RepresentationalismIn Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, Continuum. pp. 209-235. 2014.This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism
-
74Review of Dominic Gregory's Showing, Seeming, and Sensing (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 0-0. 2014.
-
3060Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality TheoriesPhilosophy Compass 9 (5): 325-337. 2014.This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that natura…Read more
-
1100Mental Representation and Closely Conflated TopicsDissertation, Princeton University. 2010.This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
-
119Review of Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro's A Brief History of the Soul (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 0-0. 2012.
-
1282Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's Cognitive Phenomenology (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3): 601-604. 2013.A review of Cognitive Phenomenology by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, with some thoughts on the epistemology of the cognitive phenomenology debate.
London, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Phenomenal Intentionality |