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3036Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality TheoriesPhilosophy Compass 9 (5): 325-337. 2014.This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that natura…Read more
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1091Mental Representation and Closely Conflated TopicsDissertation, Princeton University. 2010.This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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119Review of Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro's A Brief History of the Soul (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 0-0. 2012.
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1279Review of Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague's Cognitive Phenomenology (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3): 601-604. 2013.A review of Cognitive Phenomenology by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague, with some thoughts on the epistemology of the cognitive phenomenology debate.
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1897Pure Intentionalism About Moods and EmotionsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 135-157. 2013.Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods repr…Read more
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501Phenomenal IntentionalityThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
London, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Phenomenal Intentionality |