-
1892Pure Intentionalism About Moods and EmotionsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. pp. 135-157. 2013.Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods repr…Read more
-
499Phenomenal IntentionalityThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
-
738Review of Tim Bayne's The Unity of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Psychology 26 (1): 158-162. 2013.
-
981Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable MisrepresentationDisputatio 8 (42): 57-92. 2016.Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the views. This paper cla…Read more
-
1993Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental RepresentationPhilosophical Studies 165 (2): 421-443. 2013.It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
-
1662Intentionalism about MoodsThought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 126-136. 2013.According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same…Read more
London, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Phenomenal Intentionality |