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399Getting 'Lucky' with GettierEuropean Journal of Philosophy 21 (1): 37-49. 2013.In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic Luck, a g…Read more
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124Implicit Theories of Intellectual Virtues and Vices: A Focus on Intellectual HumilityJournal of Positive Psychology 5 (10): 389-406. 2014.The study of intellectual humility is still in its early stages and issues of definition and measurement are only now being explored. To inform and guide the process of defining and measuring this important intellectual virtue, we conducted a series of studies into the implicit theory – or ‘folk’ understanding – of an intellectually humble person, a wise person, and an intellectually arrogant person. In Study 1, 350 adults used a free-listing procedure to generate a list of descriptors, one for …Read more
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36Intellectual Humility: An Introduction to the Philosophy and ScienceBloomsbury Academic. 2017.Two intellectual vices seem to always tempt us: arrogance and diffidence. Regarding the former, the world is permeated by dogmatism and table-thumping close-mindedness. From politics, to religion, to simple matters of taste, zealots and ideologues all too often define our disagreements, often making debate and dialogue completely intractable. But to the other extreme, given a world with so much pluralism and heated disagreement, intellectual apathy and a prevailing agnosticism can be simply all …Read more
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215When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemologyPhilosophical Psychology 28 (8): 1095-1113. 2015.In this paper, we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions—agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism —as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type…Read more
Hillsdale, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Epistemology of Religion |
PhilPapers Editorships
Virtue Epistemology |
The Gettier Problem |
Divine Hiddenness |
Religious Pluralism |