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4Zarys naturalistycznej koncepcji intencjonalnościPrzeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 86 (2): 389-400. 2013.
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Podmiot i predykat: krytyka koncepcji Petera F. StrawsonaPrzeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 79. 2011.
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488A New Perspective for the Theory of IntentionalityIn Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis, De Gruyter. pp. 513-526. 2012.
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O pojęciu „racjonalności” (II)Filozofia Nauki 3. 1995.The paper is divided into two parts. Part one (published in Filozofia Nauki, no 1-2/1995) contains revies of main types of rationality that can be found in literature, and an attempt to point out various relations among these types. Part two is devoted to analysis of some issues concerning detailed problems of rationality (e.g.: How to define rationality? Is rationality decidable? Does it come in degrees?).
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130Do we need a new theory of truthmaking? Some comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and explanationPhilosophical Studies 165 (2): 591-604. 2013.In the paper we discuss criticisms against David Armstrong’s general theory of truthmaking by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter Schulte and Benjamin Schnieder, and conclude that Armstrong’s theory survives these criticisms. Special attention is given to the problems concerning Entailment Principle, Conjunction Thesis, Disjunction Thesis and to the notion of explanation
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28Można w coś wierzyć! (polemika z książką Bogdana Chwedeńczuka, „Trzeba w coś wierzyć?”)Etyka 30 200-211. 1997.
Warsaw, Poland
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
1 more
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Religion |
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Metaphilosophy |