Paloma Perez-Ilzarbe

Jerónimo Pardo's analysis of the problems raised by some popular trinitarian paralogisms is studied in this paper. The purpose is to show how the notions employed by the theologians in order to solve theological problems were introduced into a textbook on logic to deal with some genuinely logical problems. First, the problem, common to all logical approaches, of achieving a fine-grained analysis of the logical form of syllogistical inferences. Second, the problem, typical of the terminist approach to logic, of guaranteeing that Latin is an adequate vehicle for logical analysis.

I examine a sixteenth-century development of the anti-realist propositional semantics which is based on the notion of ‘mode’. Pardo uses this notion to offer a personal interpretation of the Buridanian criticism of complexe significabilia. He develops a middle way between the reduction of the significate of propositions to particular things and the postulation of non-standard entities which are only complexly signifiable. The key to this middle way is Pardo's understanding of the notion of ‘mode’ as connoting a relation between individual things. He offers a new interpretation of the signification of syncategorematic terms, and a definition of ‘comparative’ notions, by which something is known ‘relatively’ with respect to some other thing. And a real relational correlate is postulated for these relational ways of knowing. Relations are thus used to grant a specific significate of propositions, without renouncing the strict Buridanian rejection of any extra-categorial complexe significabilia. The role of r...

The first section of this article offers a reconstruction of Buridan's theory of propositions, along the following lines: on the syntactic plane, propositions obtain a special type of unity from the presence of a copula; on the semantic plane, the fact that a proposition does not have any specific significate (different from the significate of terms), does not erase the distinction between propositions and terms: the copula performs an act of saying, in virtue of which propositions can be true or false. The second section sumarises Pardo's theory of propositions, showing how in this case a Buridanian starting point led to a result very different from that which Buridan reached.

The aim of this article is to help to clarify the role which Aristotle gives to definition in his theory of demonstration. I shall begin by examining his handling of the relations between definition and demonstration in chapters 8-10 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, in order to provide an outline for an interpretation of Aristotle's thought. Secondly, I shall examine chapter 10 in more detail, bringing out the contrast between the commentary by Averroes and that of Grosseteste. I have chosen these two commentators because, both being generally magnificent interpreters of Aristotle, as far as the nature and types of definition are concerned their understanding of Aristotle is strikingly different.

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 405 - 423 This article deals with a brief _difficultas_ in the _Tractatus de compositione propositionis mentalis_ by Fernando de Enzinas: _qualiter copule significent tempus et an copule de presenti et preterito sint synonime_. A progressive determination of the signification of the copula is analysed: first, Enzinas defines his position about the principal syncategorematic signification of the copula; then, he analyses the sense of the consignification of time traditionally attributed to the copula. The originality of Enzinas’ position is highlighted, given the fact that he gives preference to the question as to _how_ the copulae signify time rather than the question as to _which_ time the copulae signify

Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental propositions is developed into several specific thesis about mental propositions: a) it is not judgement which gives its unity to mental propositions, but judicative acts always follow some previous apprehensive act that is simple in its own right; b) this simplicity is compatible with a certain kind of complexity, that can be explained in terms of the "causal history" of the acts of knowing; c) traditional conceptions about subject and predicate must be recast, while keeping their usual explicative power concerning logical properties; d) of course, the traditional conception about the copula has been modified, giving rise to a fully innovative conception of the nature of mental propositions. Nevertheless, this innovative conception of mental language seems still infected by certain "common sense" prejudices, which lead Pardo to propose also a provocative conception of vocal language, which I consider unnecessary.