Paloma Perez-Ilzarbe

This paper is an attempt to rethink from two perspectives Buridan’s ideas concerning knowledge: On the one hand, I explore Buridan’s theory of knowledge in the hope that it will shed some light on the intuition that the structure of propositions determines the justification of our beliefs on various different levels. On the other hand, I would like to contribute to demonstrating the consistency of Buridan’s thought,which has been remarked by almost all scholars working on Buridan: in particular, I am interested in exploring the benefits of using supposition theory when applied to the theory of knowledge. I will start by examining Buridan’s conception of scientia (as opposed to error, opinio and fides), from the perspective of two distinctions which are very important to Buridan’s theory of the proposition: complexio/enunciatio and enunciatio/assensus. Then I will recall Buridan’s analysis of propositions (and his use of supposition to define truth conditions) to show their consistency with this conception of knowledge.

Eugenio d'Ors develops a non-reductionistic idea of science which contrasts with both the positivist idea of science, as well as with the pragmatist attempt to recover the links between science and life. In addition to the purely rational elements present in science d'Ors also finds certain creative elements, both in the origin of science and in its architecture, which allow him to construct an accurate image of science as a complex human activity. According to this image, science arises from practical needs but goes beyond them. It not only establishes laws but also searches for causes, using rational methods in addition to intuition and “irony”. While science constructs its objects and is based on intersubjectivity, it nevertheless reaches a true understanding of reality.

From the medieval and post-medieval analyses dealing with propositions and time one gathers that their relation can be considered from various points of view. It could be said that there is not one "time" connected with a proposition, but several "times": following d'Ors, I will distinguish at least three: the time of the utterance, the time of the copula, and the time of truth. These three times of the proposition may or may not coincide. In these pages I propose to examine one of the problems raised by the possible separation of times. I will use as a guide the reflections of the Spanish logician Jerónimo Pardo (†1502) regarding the question of whether or not the mental true contingent proposition can be falsified.

In 1980 L. M. de Rijk edited some texts connected with medieval disputation ( Die mittelaterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi ), towards which he showed a strikingly contemptuous attitude. The reason for his contempt was that the treatises did not fit the obligationes and sophismata tradition. In this article I focus on the original version, the Thesaurus Philosophorum , to highlight the distinction of this family of treatises with respect to the “modern“ tradition. First, I study the features of the disputation that can be recognised through the collection of fallacious arguments contained in the Thesaurus . Second, I briefly examine the contents of the treatise and their arrangement, showing that they are closely related to the kind of disputation in question. I hope to support the idea that neither the technique of disputation nor the contents and their arrangement deserve a straightforward rejection

This paper presents an outline of Carlos Vaz Ferreira's moderate anti-intellectualism, paying special attention to the relations between science and philosophy as complementary aspects of human knowledge. Explicitly opposing William James's radical anti-intellectualism, and thus apparently anti-Pragmatist, Vaz is in fact very close to the central ideas of Pragmatism. A defense of reason as a valuable help for penetrating into reality, combined with the recognition of extra-rational elements that contribute to human apprehension of reality, results in a position that can be characterized by its anti-rationalism, fallibilism and pluralism.

Jerónimo Pardo's analysis of the problems raised by some popular trinitarian paralogisms is studied in this paper. The purpose is to show how the notions employed by the theologians in order to solve theological problems were introduced into a textbook on logic to deal with some genuinely logical problems. First, the problem, common to all logical approaches, of achieving a fine-grained analysis of the logical form of syllogistical inferences. Second, the problem, typical of the terminist approach to logic, of guaranteeing that Latin is an adequate vehicle for logical analysis.