Paloma Perez-Ilzarbe

This paper is an attempt to rethink from two perspectives Buridan’s ideas concerning knowledge: On the one hand, I explore Buridan’s theory of knowledge in the hope that it will shed some light on the intuition that the structure of propositions determines the justification of our beliefs on various different levels. On the other hand, I would like to contribute to demonstrating the consistency of Buridan’s thought,which has been remarked by almost all scholars working on Buridan: in particular, I am interested in exploring the benefits of using supposition theory when applied to the theory of knowledge. I will start by examining Buridan’s conception of scientia (as opposed to error, opinio and fides), from the perspective of two distinctions which are very important to Buridan’s theory of the proposition: complexio/enunciatio and enunciatio/assensus. Then I will recall Buridan’s analysis of propositions (and his use of supposition to define truth conditions) to show their consistency with this conception of knowledge.

From the medieval and post-medieval analyses dealing with propositions and time one gathers that their relation can be considered from various points of view. It could be said that there is not one "time" connected with a proposition, but several "times": following d'Ors, I will distinguish at least three: the time of the utterance, the time of the copula, and the time of truth. These three times of the proposition may or may not coincide. In these pages I propose to examine one of the problems raised by the possible separation of times. I will use as a guide the reflections of the Spanish logician Jerónimo Pardo (†1502) regarding the question of whether or not the mental true contingent proposition can be falsified.

The complexity of the scholastic view of descent stems from the attempt to find a reply to three different questions at the same time: those pertaining to the meaning of propositions, the relationships of inference between propositions, and the truth conditions of propositions. From each of these issues there arises a different sequence of developments to this doctrine, each of which has its own problems and solutions. Initially, the concept of descent is introduced in response to the problem of determining the meaning of quantified propositions. This is the first axis of the development of the doctrine of descent, according to which descent consists of the construction of individual propositions which make explicit the meaning of the quantified proposition. The appearance of these new propositions, however, gives rise to the second axis in the development of the doctrine of descent. As soon as we have this multiplicity of singular propositions, it is possible to forget where they came from and how, simply considering the problem of their logical relationship with the original quantified proposition. This is how descent comes to be viewed not as an analysis of the meaning of the proposition, but as a relationship of consequence: that which could be established between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions. Lastly, when descent is considered as a relationship of consequence, it is possible to develop this doctrine in a third direction, given that this relationship between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions can be used as a means of showing the truth or falsehood of the quantified proposition. Pardo’s text is a good example of the problems which the concept of descent inevitably encounters when it is approached from three points of view which are superimposed upon each other without regard for their radical diversity.