Paul Coates

This chapter defends a projectivist account of perception. Distinctions are drawn between theories of perception, the philosophical pictures that motivate such theories, and the functions of perception in our lives. According to the _Navigational Picture_, the central function of perception is to provide knowledge about objects that enables subjects to navigate around their environment and make beneficial use of it. None of this requires the revelation of the intrinsic nature of the sensible properties of external objects. The _Confrontation Picture_ underlies Direct Realism. It is argued that this theory of perception cannot provide a positive account of the experiential relation it posits, or explain how the individual contents of experiences are determined. These considerations support a causal theory of perception, whereby phenomenal qualities are located on the side of the observer, and not in the objects we perceive. They are projected onto the objects we take to be present.

Design science research (DSR) has become a popular method in information systems research and has been warmly welcomed in other disciplines as well. The importance of DSR is evident, in terms of its contribution to knowledge, as well as the creation of artefacts to solve problems of common interest. While it has demonstrated a clear methodology for achieving research goals, the philosophical underpinnings are not widely synthesised. There are inconsistencies and voids related to the philosophical aspects of DSR. For example, there is an inconsistent argument among researchers regarding the definition of design science research in the first place. This study analysed six key texts published within the last fifteen years in design science research along with a critical discussion, with the help of the existing literature. Accordingly, the study presents suggestions for the philosophical aspects of DSR. Namely, the definitions related to DSR terms (design, design science, design science research, and research), philosophical aspects (ontology, epistemology, and axiology), and theory development approaches (inductive, deductive, abductive, and retroductive), as well as research strategies were discussed. This is recommended to take as a starting point for a formative discussion of the topic, fine-tuning ideas with a critical eye.

The intention of this project is to argue theoretically for, and exemplify through critical and historical analysis, the interrelatedness of discourses on scale, distance, identification and doubling in the cinema. The link between the first two terms (scale and distance) and the latter two (identification and doubling) is implicit in the title, and its unfolding constitutes the project: for instance, the closer one comes, the deeper identification is likely to be, and the greater the likelihood that what is apparently 'there' will impose itself as also 'here', existing both inside and outside the viewing psyche, which becomes double, and whose doubling may either become explicit or remain implicit in the text. Along with its collapsing of interiority/exteriority distinctions, doubling reveals the reversibility and ambiguity of scale, as what is 'there' could just as well have been situated 'here'. The book contains analyses of a wide variety of films, including Citizen Kane, The Double Life of Veronique, The Great Gatsby, Gilda, Vertigo and Wings of Desire.

This paper offers a partial defence of a Sellarsian-inspired form of scientific realism. It defends the relocation strategy that Sellars adopts in his project of reconciling the manifest and scientific images. It concentrates on defending the causal analysis of perception that is essential to his treatment of sensible qualities. One fundamental metaphysical issue in perception theory concerns the nature of the perceptual relation; it is argued that a philosophical exploration of this issue is continuous with the scientific investigation of perceptual processes. Perception, it is argued, can, and should, be naturalised. A challenge for any account of perception arises from the fact that a subject’s experiences are connected with particular objects. We need to supply principled grounds for identifying which external physical object the subject stands in a perceptual relation to when they have an experience. According to the particularity objection presented in the paper, naive realism does not constitute an independently viable theory since, taken on its own, it is unable to answer the objection. In appealing to a ‘direct experiential relation’, it posits a relation that cannot be identified independently of the underlying causal facts. A proper understanding of one central function of perception, as guiding extended patterns of actions, supports a causal analysis of perception. It allows us to draw up a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for perceiving that avoids well-known counterexamples. An analysis of this kind is congruent with the scientific account, according to which experiences are interpreted as inner states: sensible qualities, such as colours, are in the mind. A Sellarsian version of the relocation story is thus vindicated.

Chess is sometimes referred to as a ‘mind-sport’. Yet, in obvious ways, chess is very unlike physical sports such as tennis and soccer; it doesn't require the levels of fitness and athleticism necessary for such sports. Nor does it involve the sensory-governed, skilled behaviour required in activities such as juggling or snooker. Nevertheless, I suggest, chess is closer than it may at first seem to some of these sporting activities. In particular, there are interesting connections between the way that we use our perceptual imagination in sports, and also in chess. The same distinction between calculation and natural instinct applies in chess as it does in many physical sports.

A cluster of experiments on “Change Blindness”, “Inattentional Blindness” and associated phenomena appear to demonstrate extremely counter intuitive results. According to one plausible characterisation, these results show that we consciously take in far less of the visual world than it seems we are aware of. It is worth briefly summarising the results of two recent sets of experiments, in order to give a flavour of this work. In ‘Gorillas in our Midst’ (Simons, D. and Chabris, C., Perception, 1999, 28), subjects were asked to perform a task that involved watching a video of a casual basketball game that lasts for about a minute. The task involves counting the number of consecutive passes between members of the one of the teams. While the basketball is being thrown from player to player, something unexpected takes place: a person dressed in a black gorilla-suit walks through the play, stops briefly in the centre of the picture, thumps his chest, and then walks off. Although most subjects correctly record the number of passes made by the team, at least half of these subjects fail to notice the gorilla-suited interloper, who is visible for about nine seconds. When shown the video sequence a second time they are amazed to observe what they had previously overlooked.