Peter Ochs

This is the first study of Charles Peirce's philosophy as a form of writing and the first study of his pragmatic writings as a critique of the modern attempt to change society by writing philosophy. According to Ochs, Peirce concluded that his own pragmatism displayed the errors of modernity, attempting to recreate rather than repair modern philosophy. His self-critique - which he called pragmaticism - refashions pragmatism as what Ochs calls a 'pragmatic method of reading': a method of, first, uncovering the conflicting beliefs that generate modern philosophies and, second, recommending ways of repairing these conflicts. Redescribing Peirce's pragmatism as 'the logic of scripture', Ochs suggests that Christians and Jews may in fact re-read pragmatism as a logic of Scripture: that is, as a modern philosopher's way of diagramming the Bible's rules for repairing broken lives and healing societal suffering.

This is a response to a Symposium on Phenomenology and Scripture. In examining a move from phenomenology to scripture, this symposium does not address all possible readers; it addresses a specific readership, for a specific reason, and within the framework of specific assumptions. By way of response, I want first to identify a few features of what I take to be the symposium’s specific address or context. Then, I will comment on what messages I believe the authors have delivered to this context. The symposium specifically addresses those who participate willy nilly in the transcendental project of modern philosophy and of modern northern Europe. In that project, knowing, as noesis, means intentionality: its subject or agent is ultimately reducible to the unity of apperception; and its object— noema—is the object of the ego’s intentional knowing—the thematized object. It appears, furthermore, that the symposium identifies phenomenology not only with the species of Husserlian philosophy, but also with the broader genus of all efforts, from Descartes to Kant to Hegel to Husserl to Heidegger, to identify philosophy with an effort to frame the a priori conditions for, or the possibility of, knowing what we would know: from self to world to being itself—or to God.

A Pragmatic Method of Reading Confused Philosophic Texts: The Case of Peirce's "Illustrations" In 1878, Charles Peirce introduced a method for making confused ideas clear. In this essay, I put Peirce's method to work as a method for making confused writing clear, in particular, for clarifying the meaning of confused philosophic arguments as they appear in philosophic essays. In Section I, I introduce the method as a Pragmatic Method of Reading Confused Philosophic Texts. In Section II, I re• view Peirce's 1877-78 "Illustrations of the Logic of Science"\ as examples of confused texts. In Section III, I apply the Pragmatic Method, reading Peirce's "Illustrations' as expressions of fundamentally contradictory "leading tendencies of thought." While it does not resolve such contradictions, the Pragmatic Method renders a confused text clear by enabling us to read it as a collection of two "implicit" texts, or two sets of meanings.