113The Formulation of Epistemological DisjunctivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 86-104. 2016.I argue that we should question the orthodox way of thinking about epistemological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of states of seeing things as opposed to states of seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core aspects of epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a standard formulation of epistemological disjunctivism—…Read more
204This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: What is perceptual learning?
270This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we model the unity of consciousness?
Nottingham UniversityDepartment of PhilosophyAssistant Professor
University College London
Department of Philosophy
Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
|Philosophy of Mind|