Mariusz Grygianiec

The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se and entia successiva. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects qua occurrents or only to objects qua continuants or only to persons

The ontological theory of point eventism appears in the Polish philosophical literature as Zdzisław Augustynek's original work, belonging to the glorious philosophical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author concentrates exclusively on "weak points" of Augustynek's eventism (skipping simultaneously all its unquestionable advantages); he examines basic notions and statements of the analysed doctrine. The main aim of this critical survey is to prepare a ground for a proper reconstruction of this ontological stance

There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional i.e. they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D-ism and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them

In a series of influential articles Jaegwon Kim has developed strong arguments against nonreductive physicalism as a possible solution to the problem of mental causation. One of them is the Supervenience Argument which states that assuming the mental/physical supervenience thesis, the causal closure principle, the exclusion principle with the no-overdetermination requirement and property dualism we obtain the conclusion that mental causation is unintelligible. On the other hand Collin McGinn has argued that a solution to the mind-body problem is forever beyond our reach: we can never understand how the brain produces consciousness and therefore the relation between them must remain mysterious. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Kim's Supervenience Argument corroborates McGinn's pessimistic conclusion (of course, if we do not assume any form of reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism). Thereby it tries to show that the Supervenience Argument could be treated as a justification of non-constructive naturalism (aka new misterianism): we do not understand mental causation, because we cannot understand how the brain generates consciousness. It also suggest considering possibility that the thesis of causal closure of the physical domain might entail the cognitive closure thesis (the claim that those properties of the brain which are responsible for conscious processes are in principle cognitively closed to us)

In the paper the most popular arguments in favour of the doctrine of temporal parts are presented and analysed. The author discusses the following arguments: (i) from analogy; (ii) from ontological parsimony; (iii) from intrinsic change; (iv) from mereological change; (v) against presentism; (vi) from time travel; (vii) from vagueness; (viii) from coincidence. The main aim of the paper is to show - in the light of examined arguments - that the 3D-ism/4D-ism equivalence thesis might be treated as a well-founded conjecture

In the text Zdarzenia, rzeczy, procesy Zdzisław Augustynek argued against some versions of liberal reism that they are not able to deliver appropriate, non-circular definitions both of events and moments respectively. The main aim of the article is to show that the objection in question is not sound: indeed, we are vested with a proce-dure to find a way out from the indicated difficulty. In the text three forms of liberal reism are presented and their problems with the relevant definitions are analysed. Then the schematic method of defining the aforementioned categories is proposed and discussed. The presented considerations are crowned with the conclusion that in the light of the suggested reconstructions Augustynek's pessimistic evaluation of reistic doctrines should not be seen as a correct one

There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism (4D). Sometimes 4D is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional i.e. they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them.