Mariusz Grygianiec

The main aim of the paper is to revive Zdzisław Augustynek's attempts to define the relation of genidentity. The text embraces the following issues: (i) a presentation of three axiomatic definitions of genidentity; (ii) a reconstruction of the definitions in question in the language of the predicate calculus; (iii) a supplementing the above reconstruction by appropriate proofs; (iv) an analysis of the selected methodological and ontological assumptions of the discussed systems; (v) a comparison of Augustynek's systems with Eugeniusz Żabski's proposal; (vi) an outline of the definition of a thing as an abstractum (equivalence class, invariant) over the set of all punctual events under a relation of genidentity

The paper offers a sketchy reconstruction of axiomatic foundations of Zalta's theory of abstract objects. The theory is based on Ernst Mally's distinction between two types of predication: an exemplification of properties and an encoding of properties. The author shows how the theory in question could be used to reconstruct in a satisfying way many other metaphysical theories e.g. the theory of Platonic Forms, the theory of situations, the theory of possible worlds. The paper also provides several critical comments to some presumptions and consequences of the analyzed metaphysical doctrine

In a number of his essays E. J. Lowe has presented an interesting argument for the ontological simplicity of the self. This argument became the subject of Eric T. Ol-son’s polemic reaction, who tried — unsuccesfully — to discover a formal mistake in the argument. Eventually, the modified and improved version of Lowe’s reasoning came out in his paper Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self. It seemed that the argument for the ontological simplicity of the self has resisted criticism. In my paper, I present a few manoeuvres which can be used by advocates of animalism to dismiss conclusions of Lowe’s argument. An animalist may want to do that for a simple reason: on the basis of animalism it is difficult to argue for the thesis of the simplicity of the self, as persons are — according to animalism — human organisms, that is, composite objects. My analysis shows that the simplicity argument — al-though it remains formally valid — is not sound in the light of the shown difficulties and shortcomings. This enables me to insist on an animalistic interpretation of the subjectaccording to which the self is a composite material object, identical with a liv-ing human organism

Mereologcal essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states, that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). The principle may also be put by saying, that every object has the parts that it has necessarily. In the paper the above mentioned doctrine is reconstructed and analysed. Some consequences of the theory in question as well as many variants of it are examined. The main purpose of the text is to provide a critical analysis of mereological essentialism in order to make this radical doctrine more acceptable

The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable or inaccurate, thus unsound one

The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scien-tific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (stage view and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theo-ries, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give the general account of the relation of genidentity within a conceptual framework of these theories. The second aim is to provide a suitable reconstruction of criteria of genidentity, which are appropriate for the three metaphysical doctrines

The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism (ME) and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality , non-constitutivity , constantiality , anti-identism ( non-bodility ), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to the many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable answers