Franco V. Trivigno

Despite the prevalence of laughter in the dialogues, Plato’s explicit theorizing about laughter is mainly critical. This chapter examines exactly Plato’s views on the moral harmfulness of laughter, as expressed in his three distinct analyses: in _Republic_ 3, Socrates argues that powerful laughter provokes a powerful change in character; in _Republic_ 10, Socrates charges that comedy tempts even decent people to laugh at inappropriate jokes, thus strengthening the lower part of one’s soul; and in the _Philebus_, Socrates gives a definition of “the ridiculous” in terms of self-ignorance, and he provides an analysis of “derisive laughter,” on which it indulges an unjust emotion, _phthonos_ (“envy” or “malice”). The chapter argues that these criticisms are mutually supporting and aimed at specific kinds of laughter, and then, turning to the _Laws_, provides an analysis of ethically appropriate laughter and lays out the educational benefits of comedy.

This paper analyses the portrayal of Hippias as a comic impostor, or _ἀλαζών_, in Plato’s _Hippias Major._ First, the comedy involves an appropriate attack on Hippias, a self-ignorant pretender to knowledge of the fine, and diagnoses the philosophical source of his self-ignorance by examining two instructive mistakes: Hippias takes fineness to be perceiver-relative and to concern causing pleasure. Second, the goal of the absent questioner device is to expose Hippias as an impostor for the reader and to make an important point about the appropriate relationship between discourse, refutation, and ridiculousness. For Socrates, it is a way to get Hippias to engage in philosophical conversation aimed at the truth—arguably his only path to genuine fineness—and thereby make him a better person. Last, his blindness is crucial to the dialogue’s comedic unity and its consistency with other dialogues. If so, then doubts about the _Hippias Major_’s authenticity should be put to rest.

Chapter 8 focusses on _Statesman_ 291a1-297b4 and argues that, according to the Eleatic Visitor, the single criterion for right rule (_orthē archē_) is the wisdom or expertise of the statesman; thus it is entirely irrelevant to right rule whether the statesman rules without laws and by force. But he also says that judges and orators possess arts that are ‘precious and related to statecraft’ (303e9-10), suggesting that law and consent will be essential to the statesman’s governance. The solution to this puzzle hangs on an elaboration of the content and teleological structure of statecraft. This expertise aims at and achieves what is beneficial (most just) to the city, and it is for the statesman to decide when laws and consent are actually beneficial. Since laws and consent are tools that _typically_ facilitate the goals of statecraft, they are ‘marks’ of right rule, even though neither is a criterion of right rule.

In Sophocles’s _Oedipus at Colonus_, the third choral ode presents a dark and pessimistic view of human life, whereby it is best never to have been born and second best to die young. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the pessimistic position advocated by the chorus, the core of which is an endorsement of the _goodness of death_. Their conclusion rests on two premises: a _quantitative_ account of the amount of pain a typical human life contains and a _narrative_ account of the life trajectory of a typical human life. After laying out the chorus’s position, the chapter assesses their view and situates it within recent philosophical debates in two areas: on the nature and value of death and on the relationship between well-being and time. In the end, the life of Oedipus, as presented in the tragedy, exemplifies the chorus’s dark perspective.

This Element defends an interpretation of Plato's Ion on which its primary concern is with audience reception of poetry. The dialogue countenances and rejects two models of poetic reception, the expertise model and the inspiration model, both of which make the audience entirely passive in relation to poetry; and it presents the character of Ion as a comedic figure, a self-ignorant fool whose foolishness is a function of his passive relation to Homer. In the end, this Element argues that, for Plato, critical engagement is the proper way for audiences to treat poetry. This view holds open the possibility that poetry may express some truths without thereby endorsing the idea that poets are experts who have authoritative knowledge.

Ancient philosophers were very interested in the themes of laughter, humor, and comedy. They theorized about laughter and its causes, moralized about the appropriate uses of humor and what it is appropriate to laugh at, and wrote treatises on comedic composition. Further, they were often merciless in ridiculing their opponents’ positions, often borrowing comedic devices and techniques from comic poetry and drama to do so. The volume is organized around three themes or sets of questions. The first set concerns the psychology of laughter. What is going on in our minds when we laugh? What background conditions must be in place for laughter to occur? Is laughter necessarily hostile or derisive? The second set of questions concerns the ethical and social norms governing laughter and humor. When is it appropriate or inappropriate to laugh? Does laughter have a positive social function? Is there a virtue, or excellence, connected to laugher and humor? The third set of questions concerns the philosophical uses of humor and comedic technique. Do philosophers use humor exclusively in criticizing other rivals, or can it play a positive educational role as well? If it can, how does philosophical humor communicate its philosophical content? This volume aims not to settle these fascinating questions but more modestly to start a conversation about them, in the hope that the volume will be both a reference point for discussions of laughter, humor, and comedy in ancient philosophy and an engine for future research about them.

Since ancient times, character, virtue, and happiness have been central to thinking about how to live well. Yet until recently, philosophers have thought about these topics in an empirical vacuum. Taking up the general challenge of situationism – that philosophers should pay attention to empirical psychology – this interdisciplinary volume presents new essays from empirically informed perspectives by philosophers and psychologists on western as well as eastern conceptions of character, virtue, and happiness, and related issues such as personality, emotion and cognition, attitudes and automaticity. Researchers at the top of their fields offer exciting work that expands the horizons of empirically informed research on topics central to virtue ethics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato's MenexenusFranco V. TrivignoIn Plato's Menexenus, Socrates spends nearly the entire dialogue reciting an epitaphios logos, or funeral oration, that he claims was taught to him by Aspasia, Pericles' mistress. Three difficulties confront the interpreter of this dialogue. First, commentators have puzzled over how to understand the intention of Socrates' funeral oration (see Clavaud 1980, 17–77).1 Some insist that it is parodic, performing an essentially critical function (e.g., Loraux 1986); while others claim that it is serious, in particular as an expression of Plato's political ideal (e.g., Kahn 1963).2 Adherents on both sides seem to think that the options are mutually exclusive.3 Second, commentators have had difficulty understanding why Plato would have Socrates attribute his entire oration to Aspasia (e.g., Coventry 1989, 3; Pownall 2004, 60). Most agree that this move is ironic and that it has something to do with the alleged target of the dialogue's criticism. But scholars have differed over whether the Aspasia reference is meant to implicate Pericles' funeral oration (Monoson 1998), rhetoric in general (Pownall 2004), Athens (Loraux 1986), or even Aeschines (Clavaud 1980).4 Third, scholars have struggled to make sense of the dialogue's "deliberate and fantastic anachronism" (Dodds 1990, 24). In the funeral oration, Socrates relates the history of Athens up to the King's Peace in 386 B.C., a full thirteen years after he has died. This problem has generated the least consensus, with some scholars restricting their analysis [End Page 29] to dating considerations (e.g., Dodds 1990) and at least one speculating that Socrates speaks in this dialogue as a ghost (Rosenstock 1994).5It is the contention of this article that, by understanding the rhetoric of parody in the Menexenus, one can resolve these difficulties and come to a coherent and unified understanding of the philosophical intentions of the dialogue.6 More specifically, I will show that the anachronism is a consequence of a particular parodic strategy, that of amplification; that the dialogue's parody targets not only Pericles' funeral oration in particular but funeral oratory, rhetoric, and Athens as well; and that the parody has serious philosophical implications.7 Further, I claim that the serious philosophical content is both critical and constructive. Plato subverts the civic identity and understanding of virtue encouraged by the genre of funeral oration, and he challenges its praise-based model of political discourse. At the same time, Plato's parodic criticism is not entirely negative, for it relies on alternative paradigms of civic identity, virtue, and political discourse.I. The Rhetoric of ParodyBefore turning to the Menexenus itself, I want to clarify what I mean by parody. For a working definition, I suggest that parody is "an imitation that distorts a target text, author, or genre."8 In order to make some general observations about the rhetoric of parody, I will look briefly at an exemplar of parody from Aristophanes' Frogs. I do so for three reasons: to display two strategies of parodic distortion, to show that parody can have multiple targets, and to argue that parody can have both serious and complex intentions.9In the Frogs (1331–63), Aristophanes uses at least two techniques of parodic distortion, inversion and amplification, in his extended parody of Euripides' monodies or single-actor odes.10 Parodic inversion, broadly speaking, upsets or overturns the target text by distorting the original in a way that reverses the stylistic effect or semantic intention. Parodic amplification hones in on one aspect of the target text and amplifies it to absurdity, often exposing its artificiality as a literary trope.The parodic scene features a woman who awakens, hysterical and terrified, from a god-sent dream, which has conveyed disturbing news. We find in this passage a particular kind of parodic inversion: bathos, the unexpected introduction of the vulgar, ordinary, or mundane, which undermines an otherwise somber tone.11 Consider the following excerpt:Attendants, set alight a lamp for me,Collect the dew of rivers in pitchers [End Page 30] And heat the water,So that I may wash away the god-sent dream.Oh god of the sea...

In the Protagoras, Plato presents us with a Puzzle regarding the value of interpretation. On the one hand, Socrates claims to find several familiar Socratic theses about morality and the human condition in his interpretation of a poem by Simonides (339e−347a). On the other hand, immediately after the interpretation, Socrates castigates the whole task of interpretation as “childish nonsense” appropriate for second-rate drinking parties (347d5−6).1 The core problem is this: taking Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides seriously requires undermining the significance of the claims about interpretation, but taking the criticism of interpretation seriously requires undermining the significance of Socrates’s ..