-
Review of J.L. Schellenberg's Human Reason and the Hiddenness of God (review)Canadian Philosophical Reviews (I): 63-65. 1995.
-
87God, Supernatural Kinds, and the Incarnation: THOMAS D. SENORReligious Studies 27 (3): 353-370. 1991.Thinking about God often leads to thinking about ‘God’. And it has never been completely clear how best to understand this little English word. Traditionally, ‘God’ has been taken to be either a description or a name. However, a third option has recently captured the attention of philosophical theologians. It is claimed that just as one should think of, say, ‘humanity’ as a kind term, so one should think of ‘God’, or perhaps ‘divinity’, as a kind term. But given the tight link between semantics …Read more
-
2135What if there are no political obligations? A reply to A. J. SimmonsPhilosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3): 260-268. 1987.
-
849Drawing on Many Traditions: An Ecumenical Kenotic ChristologyIn Anna Marmodoro & Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, Oxford University Press. 2011.
-
143The Knowledge-As-Perception Account of KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 91-109. 2016.William Alston once argued that justification is not necessary for knowledge. He was convinced of this because he thought that, in cases of clear perception, one could come to know that P even if one’s justification for believing P was defeated. The idea is that the epistemic strength of clear perception is sufficient to provide knowledge even where justification is lacking; perceiving (and believing) that P is sufficient for knowing that P. In this paper, I explore a claim about knowledge that …Read more
-
1074Preserving preservationism: A reply to LackeyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1). 2007.
-
1233Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory beliefSynthese 94 (3). 1993.In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epist…Read more
-
460E.J.Lowe: The Subjects of Experience (review)Philosophical Review 112 (3): 416-419. 2003.Subjects of Experience is as ambitious as it is contrary to the spirit of most of contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The reader needs a scorecard to keep track of all the currently unfashionable positions that Lowe adopts in this courageous little book. While the work ranges broadly over many topics, Lowe’s account of the self is at its core, and will be the focus of this review. However, it should be noted that one of the virtues of Subjects of Experience is its broad per…Read more
-
11The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith (edited book)Cornell University Press. 1995.A veritable who's who in the field of contemporary philosophy of religion here considers various issues in the epistemology of religious beliefs. The writings of William P. Alston, the leading figure in the revival of the Anglo-American philosophy of religion, provide the focus of these essays, all but two previously unpublished. Philosophers of religion, meta-physicians, epistemologists, and theologians will find in this volume some of the most important work available in the theory of knowledg…Read more
-
25Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 15 (6): 428-430. 1995.
-
662Should Cubs Fans Be Committed? What Bleacher Bums Have to Teach Us about the Nature of FaithIn Eric Bronson (ed.), Baseball and Philosophy, Open Court. 2004.
-
1Review of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function (review)Review of Metaphysics 925-26. 1995.
-
520MemoryIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (Second Edition), Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
-
835Harman, negative coherentism, and the problem of ongoing justificationPhilosophia 24 (3-4): 271-294. 1995.
-
370Trusting Lucy: Believing the IncredibleIn Gregory Bassham & Jerry L. Walls (eds.), The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy, Open Court. 2005.
-
34Rationality and Religious Commitment by Robert Audi (Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25The Philosophers' Magazine 57 113-114. 2012.
-
1061Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz's Law ProblemsIn Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, Oxford University Press. 2002.
-
184Justified Belief and Demon WorldsRes Philosophica 90 (2): 203-214. 2013.The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds— worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a th…Read more
-
547On Privileging God's Moral GoodnessFaith and Philosophy 23 (4): 409-422. 2006.According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks …Read more
-
550The real presence of an eternal GodIn Kevin Timpe & Eleonore Stump (eds.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, Routledge. 2009.
-
1Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (review)Philosophy in Review 15 428-430. 1995.
-
794Two factor theories, meaning wholism and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to FodorPhilosophical Psychology 5 (2): 133-151. 1992.In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor the…Read more
Fayetteville, Arkansas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Religion |