David Vessey

The nature of time-consciousness is one of the central themes of phenomenology, and one that all major phenomenologists have addressed at length, except Hans-Georg Gadamer. This paper attempts to develop Gadamer’s account of time-consciousness by looking, firstly, at two essays related to the topic, and then turning to his discussion of experience in Truth and Method (1960/1991) before, finally, considering his discussion of the unique temporality of the festival in the essay “The Relevance of the Beautiful” (1977/1986). What we find in Gadamer’s understanding of time is an emphasis on the epochal structure of timeconsciousness. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007

In this paper I take up the question of the possible influence of J. G. Fichte on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of language. I first argue that the historical record is unclear, but show that there is a deep philosophical difference between the two views and, as a result of this difference, we should conclude that the influence was small. Drawing on a distinction made by Michael Dummett, I show that Fichte understands language as encoding thought while Humboldt understands language as a medium of thought. The consequences of this difference affect a wide range of issues from their views on the nature of personal pronouns, to their theories of communicative understanding, to their theories of the proper nature of inquiry into language.

Gadamer sought to distinguish his philosophical hermeneutics from theologically driven hermeneutics. Perhaps because of that, even though he has influenced contemporary theological hermeneutics, he has very little to say about theology or religion. What he does say about religion is drawn from a reductive interpretation of religion as myths meant that posit something transcendent to help us cope with our awareness of our death. Here I explain why he thought Christianity was such a paradoxical religion, how his views might be useful for philosophers of religion and how they have been useful for theologians. I end with a critical discussion of Nicholas Wolterstorff's interpretation of Gadamer's views.

Hans-Georg Gadamer is often criticized for his account of the fusions of horizons as the ideal resolution of dialogue. I argue that in fact it is an excellent account of the successful resolution of dialogue, but only in light of a proper understanding of what Gadamer means by 'horizon' and how then horizons are fused. I do this by showing how Gadamer is drawing on the technical sense of 'horizon' found in Edmund Husserl's and Martin Heidegger's phenomenologies. In the process I show why a prominent criticism of Gadamer's account of the fusion of horizons, a criticism presented most forcefully by E. D. Hirsch, is mistaken.

The history of philosophical hermeneutics is one of expanding scope—moving from the interpretation of religious texts, to all texts, to understanding in the human sciences, to all understanding. As its scope expands it intersects with a wider range of philosophical traditions; only by making these intersections explicit can the key themes of philosophical hermeneutics come forward. I consider two central hermeneutic claims—that nature can be thought of as a text and that insights drawn from understanding texts illuminate all understanding. These ideas have roots in the Liber Naturae, especially in the writings of Hugh of St. Victor and of Robert Boyle. Understanding how they each see nature as a text enables us to clarify how Hans-Georg Gadamer must see it and draws our attention to his neglected phenomenology of reading