David Vessey

Of all the German idealists, Sartre refers the least to Fichte-so little in fact that there have been long-standing suspicions that he was not even familiar with Fichte's writings. It is perhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writings are as helpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views, especially his views on subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a key concept in Fichte's mature writings: the concept of the Anstoss, a concept which Dan Breazeale has called "Fichte's original insight." Fichte introduces the Anstoss, or "check," to explain why the I posits the world as it does. In effect, the Anstoss is the occasion of the facticity of the I. I will show that his concept can be uniquely helpful in understanding the role the body plays in Sartre's theory of inter-subjectivity. The importance of Sartre's account of the body for his theory of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity has been chronically underappreciated by his interpreters; this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify that. In turn the concept of the Anstoss provides a means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean and Fichtean ethics based on their respective accounts of inter-subjectivity.

Pragmatism can be divided between classical American pragmatism and contemporary neopragmatism. The classical pragmatists were a diverse group of thinkers. Their similarities can only be put in the most general terms: an emphasis on practice over theory; a thoroughgoing naturalism. Less diverse are the neo‐pragmatists, as they share an idea about what views of the classical pragmatists are worth preserving. They are all naturalists; they are all non‐foundationalists about justification. The interaction between the classical pragmatism and hermeneutics has been minimal. Classical pragmatism developed its own theory of signs that became a general theory of interpretation and theory of the centrality of interpretation in knowledge acquisition. Contemporary neo‐pragmatism has been influenced by philosophical hermeneutics. Some of the main figures have presented their own theories of textual interpretation that echo themes in philosophical hermeneutics, though developed from a distinctively pragmatic perspective.

Just as Augustine set the stage for the next 1000 years of hermeneutics, working through Augustine's On Christian Teaching, puts the main issues of medieval hermeneutics on the table. The text is divided into four sections. The first offers the figurative meaning of words. In the second and third sections, Augustine turns to language, conventional signs as opposed to natural signs. The final section addresses the question of how we communicate the teachings of scripture. In the background of Augustine's hermeneutics is the church father widely considered to be the first major Christian exegete, Origen. Origen's allegorical interpretations hold sway against those who dismiss the Bible as historically inaccurate. The model for the split between exegesis and theology is St. Thomas Aquinas. The differences between Aquinas's hermeneutics and Augustine's are not that great; most of the relevant views and debates were settled by the fall of the Roman Empire.

Aristotle argues that friendship is characterized by recognized, reciprocal goodwill. Friends are concerned about each other; ideally, they want the best for each other. As long as dialogue is possible, community exists, and friendship and goodwill are possible. Dialogue is a central, distinctive feature of Hans‐Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. It is rare in nineteenth‐century hermeneutics and it is all but absent in Martin Heidegger's philosophizing. Gadamer famously argues that dialogue can occur with texts and works of art, even though there is a clear difference between these dialogues and dialogues with other people. In community, we share our interpretations in dialogue, moving us ever beyond our limited, individual understanding of God and creation and becoming ever more aligned with the Infinite. The true church is the community of freely associating believers working together in dialogue to come to an intuition of the Infinite.

A central tenet of hermeneutics is the claim that dialogue is necessary for the full understanding of ourselves. It follows, then, that dialogue must be fruitful for understanding in a way in which no solitary activity can be. This dissertation provides a much needed defense of this claim by articulating and defending the essential parts of an account of intersubjectivity from which the claim follows. The dissertation is divided into three sections, each focusing on a specific part of the account of intersubjectivity-- intersubjectivity and language, intersubjectivity and time-consciousness, and intersubjectivity and the body--through a careful consideration of the views of pairs of philosophers. I focus on J. G. Fichte and Wilhelm von Humboldt on the issue of intersubjectivity and language, on Edmund Husserl and Martin Buber on the issue of intersubjectivity and time-consciousness, and on Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the issue of intersubjectivity and embodied subjectivity. Through exposing the necessity of our intersubjective relations for the very possibility of language use, awareness of time, and embodied awareness of the world, I demonstrate the existence of a pre-reflective, intersubjective relation between embodied subjects. This intercoporeal intersubjectivity requires extending traditional hermeneutics through an account of the body and a broader account of both understanding and dialogue