Barry Stocker

Introduction Life, art and mysticism Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer Logic and ethics as the limits of the world Anthony Rudd To what extent is solipsism a truth? Michael Kremer Frege at therapy Kelly Dean Jolley 'Making sense' of nonsense Conant and Diamond read Wittgenstein's Tractatus Diarmuid Costello More making sense of nonsense: from logical form to forms of life Daniel D. Hutto Saying and showing: an example from Anscombe Cora Diamond Why worry about the Tractatus? James Conant Transcendence and contradiction in the Tractatus Barry Stocker Wittgenstein's onto-logic Barry Allen Bibliography Index.

The paper is an exploration ofhow Pascal and Derrida are both concerned with the consequences of not being able to find a transcendental centre for concepts. Both establish this through a discussion of the origin of geometry, and the contradictions of establishing a discourse for the pure principles of geometry. Pascal and Derrida both refer to the anxiety produced by the infinite possibilities of system and the impossibility of finding a foundation in a limited set of principles. For Pascal the question emerges in his general philosophical work Pensées and ‘On the Spirit of Geometry’. Similarly for Derrida, what appears in his general philosophical work, also appears in a work referring to the possibility of transcendental foundations for geometry, ‘Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry’. For both philosophers questions arise of the contradictions of establishing basic concepts. Circularity inevitably appears, particularly with regard to ‘is’ and ‘being’; the concepts themselves are necessarily divided between their pure existence and their empirical applications. The essential difference suggested between Pascal and Derrida is that for Pascal, basic principles can be given an explanation in ‘reasons of the heart’, while for Derrida contradiction is necessary, present everywhere and is irreducible to any basic principle of any kind.L’article consiste en une exploration de la façon dont Pascal et Derrida se préoccupent des conséquences de ne pas pouvoir trouver un centre transcendantal pour les concepts. Tous deux en arrivent à ce constat suite à une discussion de l’origine de la géométrie, et des contradictions inhérentes au discours sur les principes purs de la géométrie. Pascal et Derrida renvoient tous deux à l’anxiété induite par les possibilités infinies du système et l’impossibilité d’une fondation se résumant à une suite limitée de principes. Pour Pascal, la question émerge dans ses Pensées et dans «De l’esprit géométrique». De façon similaire chez Derrida, la question se pose, comme dans son oeuvre générale, dans un ouvrage portant sur la possibilité de fondations transcendantales de la géométrie, Introduction à L’origine de la géométrie de E. Husserl. Pour les deux philosophes, la question se pose quant aux contradictions découlant de l’établissement de concepts fondamentaux. Une circularité est inévitable, en particulierautour du concept d’«etre»; les concepts eux-mêmes sont nécessairement divisés entre une existence pure et leur applications empiriques. La différence essentielle entre les deux penseurs, c’est que pour Pascal, les principes fondamentaux peuvent être expliqués par des «raisons du coeur», alors que pour Derrida, la contradiction est nécessaire, partout présente, et irréductible à un quelconque principe.

Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) hb: 0-521-41722-8. pb: 0-521-42721-5. Paul Patton, ed., Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory (London: Routledge. 1993) 0-4150-8256-0. Lester M. Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1993) 0-4150-9580-8. David Owen, Maturity and Modernity. Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason (London: Routledge, 1994) 0-4150-5398-6. Peter Lassmann and Ronald Spiers, eds., Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1994) hb: 0-521 -39312-4. pb: 0-521 -39719-7. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, tr. Carol Diethe (Cambridge University Press, 1994) hb: 0-521-40459-2. pb: 0-521-40610-2.

The later Wittgenstein claimed to resolve philosophical problems through returning words to their 'ordinary' use. The paradox arises that Wittgenstein's own philosophy must be written in a philosophical language and, therefore, in an extra-ordinary language. The paradox is discussed with particular reference to rules. Rules constitute language, but the account of the 'rule' itself leads to paradox and contradiction. A rule is followed and following a rule requires an interpretation. The interpretation of the rule requires a decision. The decision precedes the rule, so it justifies following a rule but there cannot be a rule for the decision itself