Clare Alexandra Palmer

Influential parts of the veterinary profession, and notably the American Veterinary Medicine Association, are promoting the routine neutering of cats and dogs that will not be used for breeding purposes. However, this view is not universally held, even among representatives of the veterinary profession. In particular, some veterinary associations in Europe defend the view that when reproduction is not an issue, then neutering, particularly of dogs, should be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, even in Europe the American view is gaining ground. In light of this situation, this paper considers whether or not routine neutering of cats and dogs, in cases where uncontrolled reproduction is not an issue, can be ethically defended. The starting point of this consideration is a review of the veterinary literature on the effects of neutering on companion animals. The focus is both on the welfare of neutered animals themselves, and on behavioral and other effects that may not directly affect the animals’ welfare, but that maybe motivating factors for owners to neuter their companion animals. Here it becomes clear that justification for routine neutering, particularly of confined male dogs, does not follow from claims about the dogs’ own welfare. The costs of neutering male dogs, in terms of the increased risk of very serious diseases, may well outweigh the benefits. Then, building on this veterinary material, but including some other, additional considerations, the paper goes through some possible ethical approaches to routine animal neutering. These ethical approaches offer different degrees of concern about, or opposition to, routine neutering. Finally, based on this ethical exploration, it is argued that routine neutering, at least in the case of non- free-ranging companion animals, raises significant ethical questions, and from some ethical perspectives, looks highly problematic.

This paper provides an overview of some key, and contrasting, ideas in environmental ethics for those unfamiliar with the field. It outlines the ways in which environmental ethicists have defended different positions concerning what matters ethically, from those that focus on human beings (including issues of environmental justice and justice between generations) to those who argue that non-human animals, living organisms, ecosystems and species have some kind of moral status. The paper also considers different theoretical approaches to environmental ethics in terms of consequentialist, broadly deontological and virtue theories. Finally, three different interpretations of moral pluralism in environmental ethics are introduced: pluralism about values, pluralism about theories, and a pragmatic, methodological pluralism.

Robin Attfield's work has been central to the development of environmental philosophy in a number of key areas, including stewardship, population, human development and the moral standing of living organisms. In this paper, I'll focus primarily on just one aspect of Attfield's work: human moral obligations to sentient animals. I'll first outline how, and in what ways, Attfield has argued that such animals are morally important. I'll then suggest that while providing a good grounding for some central concerns of animal ethics, Attfield's focus on animals' capacities, in the context of a consequentialist approach to ethics, doesn't obviously accommodate other relational concerns that we might think are important. I'll consider how a consequentialist such as Attfield might respond to this concern, and I'll conclude by explaining why this still leaves some residual worries about what I'll call "capacity-oriented" consequentialist approaches to animal ethics.