Bruce Langtry

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, sometimes asserts each of the two premises of the following argument, and also the conclusion: (1) The parties in the original position would adopt the maximin rule. (2) The maximin rule, when applied to the task pof the parties in the original position, enjoins the choice of Rawls's two principles of justice in preference to the lother listed alternative. (3) Therefore the parties would choose Rawls's two principles. In this paper I argue against premise (2). I distinguish three mutually incompatible interpretations of the task of the parties. Each is consistent with much of what says but none of them is consistent with everything he says. I argue that on none of the interpretations is there good reason to suppose that premise (2) is true.

This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call them ‘pure’ and ‘tinged.’ I argue that the distinctive claims of stakeholder theory, as contrasted with tinged stockholder theories, have been inadequately supported by argument.

J. L. Mackie, in "The Miracle of Theism" (OUP 1981), chapter 1, argues that "it is pretty well impossible that reported miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism." I argue that Mackie fails to establish this conclusion. All that he can show is that those who are initially inclined to theism or agnosticism may be justified in predicting that the next miracle report they examine will not be such as to form the basis for a worthwhile argument for theism.

Religious outlooks are combinations of theological, moral and political principles, individuated in a medium-grained way. Distinguish between religious outlooks that are friendly to the fundamental political principles characteristic of liberal democracy, and those that are hostile to, or knowingly subversive of, them. I claim that (1) in some respects, but not all, governments are justified in discriminating against 'hostile' religious outlooks, but (2) governments should not intentionally favour some 'friendly' ones over others, and (3) governments should respect all 'friendly' faith-based organisations with which it deals, but may on various grounds favour some over others

Arc there cases in which an object x is thc same F as an object y but x is not the same G as y, cvcn though x is a G? A11 aihrmativc answer will have drastic repercussions 011 0ne’s account of identity and on one’s quantification theory. For suppose that the expression ‘x is the same F as y’ can be understood as ‘x is an F and y is an F and x is identical with y’, and that ‘x is not the same G as y’ can be understood as ‘it is not the case that x is a G and y is a G and x is identical with y’. Then one may reason as follows.

This paper argues that (1) Richard Swinburne’s general account of the simplicity of empirical hypotheses fails because it involves a deeply problematic notion of postulating a property, while there is a wide range of hypotheses where the assessment of simplicity rests entirely on the number and kinds of postulated properties, (2) Swinburne’s main argument in ’The Christian God’ for the simplicity of theism, the one based on considerations about pure limitless intentional power, is significantly weaker than he seems to believe. The paper does not draw a conclusion about whether theism is simple

The version uploaded to this site is a late draft. The paper arises both from William L. Rowe's classic 1979 discussion of the problem of evil, argues that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and also from Steven Wykstra's response, in the course of which he argues for the following Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA): "On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different in some way discernible by her." My paper discusses CORNEA, and proposes a replacement principle.