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273Wiggins' defence of essentialismSouthern Journal of Philosophy 13 (4): 459-469. 1975.This paper is a critique of David Wiggins's treatment of essentialism in his book Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Blackwell 1967). I argue in detail that he has not provided an adequate account either of the concept of a sortal term or of the concept of a substance-concept, even though both concepts play important roles in his case for essentialism. I also discuss Wiggins's views on how substance-concepts are related to judgments of identity through time.
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19Colin Howson Objecting to God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Pp. xi+ 220.£ 17.99 (Pbk). ISBN 978 0 521 18665 0 (review)Religious Studies 48 (3): 415-419. 2012.
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33Some internal theodicies and the objection from alternative goodsInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (1). 1993.
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451Identity and spatio-temporal continuityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2): 184-189. 1972.This article considers recent arguments against the proposition that one and the same object cannot go out of existence and then come into existence again (so that, e.g., teleportation would involve change of identity.). It argues that these arguments can be evaded by adopting a four-dimensional ontology, according to which human beings, trees, etc., have temporal as well as spatial parts.
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Richard SwinburneIn Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), Medieval Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2, Routledge. pp. 5. 2009.In tyhis book chapterI provides concise overviews of Richard Swinburne's views on topics in natural theology and also in distinctively Christian philosophical theology; changes in his views are identified. I explain Swinburne's positive, cumulative case for the existence of God, and his discussion of objections to God based on evil, and then move on to outline his views on A tonement, Revelation, the Trinity, and the Incarnation. I then sketch his case for the truth of Christianity, and and his…Read more
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94Hume, Probability, Lotteries and MiraclesHume Studies 16 (1): 67-74. 1990.Hume’s main argument against rational belief in miracles might seem to rule out rational belief in other antecedently improbable occurrences as well--for example, a certain person’s having won the lottery. Dorothy Coleman has recently defended Hume against the lottery counterexample, invoking Hume’s distinction between probability of chances and probability of causes. I argue that Coleman’s defence fails
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24The Classical and Maximin Versions of the Two-Envelope ParadoxAustralasian Journal of Logic 2 30-43. 2004.The Two-Envelope Paradox is classically presented as a problem in decision theory that turns on the use of probabilities in calculating expected utilities. I formulate a Maximin Version of the paradox, one that is decision-theoretic but omits considerations of probability. I investigate the source of the error in this new argument, and apply the insights thereby gained to the analysis of the classical version.
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Review of "The Miracle of Theism" by J.L. Mackie (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (n/a): 195. 1984.
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304Richard M.Gale reviewed my book in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews in May 2009. The overall conclusion of my reply is that although Gale repeatedly claims that the book is defective, his review has not identified any genuine defects.
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20Miracles and rival systems of religionSophia 24 (1). 1985.This paper concerns some claims by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section X Part II -- specifically, what he says on pp.121-122 of Selby-Bigge's edition. Today (in September 2021) I have re-read the paper for the first time in decades. I cannot recommend that anyone else now read it: my argument was seriously defective. I still think, however, that its conclusion is correct, and accordingly may eventually write a new paper on the topic.
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63God, the Best, and EvilOxford University Press. 2008.God, the Best, and Evil is an original treatment of notable problems about God and his actions towards human beings. Three main topics are investigated in detail. First, if God exists, is God in some sense necessarily a value-maximizer? Second, Does a serious difficulty for the existence of God arise from the apparent fact that if God exists then God could have actualized a better possible world than this one? Thirdly are there strong objections top the existence of God based on evil? In the co…Read more
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7Government and Faith-Based Organisations in a Pluralist SocietyAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 7 (1): 72-77. 2005.Religious outlooks are combinations of theological, moral and political principles, individuated in a medium-grained way. Distinguish between religious outlooks that are friendly to the fundamental political principles characteristic of liberal democracy, and those that are hostile to, or knowingly subversive of, them. I claim that (1) in some respects, but not all, governments are justified in discriminating against 'hostile' religious outlooks, but (2) governments should not intentionally favo…Read more
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SMART, J. J. C.: "Ethics, Persuasion and Truth" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (n/a): 491. 1987.
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27Can God replace the actual world by a better one?Philosophical Papers 20 (3): 183-192. 1991.This paper has been superseded by Chapter 5 (especially section 5.4) of my book "God, the Best, and Evil" (OUP 2008). The chapter, like the journal article, is concerned with objections to the existence of God that are based on the apparent improvability of the world, yet are independent of the problem of evil.
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17Reply to Chrzan’s commentsSophia 34 (1): 74-78. 1995.This paper is the second of two in which I address Keith Chrzan's criticisms of what Alvin Plantinga says, in Chapter 9 Section 11 of The Nature of Necessity, about probabilistic arguments from evil. l clarify the issues and defend Plantinga and myself from Chrzan's criticisms.
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MORRIS, T. V.: "The Logic of God Incarnate" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (n/a): 372. 1987.
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45The maximin rule argument for Rawls's principles of justiceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1). 1985.John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, sometimes asserts each of the two premises of the following argument, and also the conclusion: (1) The parties in the original position would adopt the maximin rule. (2) The maximin rule, when applied to the task pof the parties in the original position, enjoins the choice of Rawls's two principles of justice in preference to the lother listed alternative. (3) Therefore the parties would choose Rawls's two principles. In this paper I argue against premise…Read more
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BONJOUR, L.: "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (n/a): 218. 1987.
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163Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of BusinessBusiness Ethics Quarterly 4 (4): 431-443. 1994.This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call the…Read more
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260Properly unargued belief in GodInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 26 (3). 1989.Without embracing Reformed Epistemology (advocated by Plantinga and others), I argue against two claims: (1) A person S is epistemically justified in believing that God exists only if S has a good argument for the existence of God. (2) There are no professional philosophers in our culture today who are justified in believing that God exists even though they do not have, and have never had, a good argument for the existence of God. Likely evidentialist objections are discussed at length.
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269Mackie on miraclesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3): 368-375. 1988.J. L. Mackie, in "The Miracle of Theism" (OUP 1981), chapter 1, argues that "it is pretty well impossible that reported miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism." I argue that Mackie fails to establish this conclusion. All that he can show is that those who are initially inclined to theism or agnosticism may be justified in predicting that the next miracle report they examine will not be such as to fo…Read more
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43Hume on miracles and contrary religionsSophia 14 (1). 1975.This paper addresses a line of argument in Hume's Enquiry, Section X Part 2 -- specifically, on pp.121-222 of Selby-Bigge's edition. In September 2021 I read it for the first time in several decades, and realized that the argument is seriously flawed. Although I cannot recommend that anyone else read it in its current state, perhaps by the end of 2021 I'll be in a position upload a revised version of the paper to this site.
Parkville, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |