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Gerard O'Brien

Adelaide University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    42
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    36

 More details
  • Adelaide University
    School of Humanities
    Retired faculty
University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy
DPhil, 1993
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Physical Science
  • All publications (42)
  •  129
    Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness
    with Jonathan Opie
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2): 303-305. 2004.
    Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.
    Science of Consciousness, Foundations
  •  83
    The last rites of the dynamic unconscious
    with Jon Jureidini
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 161-166. 2002.
    © 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
    Psychoanalysis and Consciousness
  •  185
    Is connectionism commonsense?
    Philosophical Psychology 4 (2): 165-78. 1991.
    Connectionism and Eliminativism
  •  127
    Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne
    with Jonathan Opie
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2): 255-263. 2000.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    The Unity of Consciousness
  •  924
    Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representation
    with Jonathan Opie
    In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, Elsevier. pp. 1--20. 2004.
    Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into …Read more
    Any creature that must move around in its environment to find nutrients and mates, in order to survive and reproduce, faces the problem of sensorimotor control. A solution to this problem requires an on-board control mechanism that can shape the creature’s behaviour so as to render it “appropriate” to the conditions that obtain. There are at least three ways in which such a control mechanism can work, and Nature has exploited them all. The first and most basic way is for a creature to bump into the things in its environment, and then, depending on what has been encountered, seek to modify its behaviour accordingly. Such an approach is risky, however, since some things in the environment are distinctly unfriendly. A second and better way, therefore, is for a creature to exploit ambient forms of energy that carry information about the distal structure of the environment. This is an improvement on the first method since it enables the creature to respond to the surroundings without actually bumping into anything. Nonetheless, this second method also has its limitations, one of which is that the information conveyed by such ambient energy is often impoverished, ambiguous and intermittent
    Theories of RepresentationRepresentation in Connectionism
  •  82
    The role of implementation in connectionist explanation
    Psycoloquy 9 (6). 1998.
    Article 3
    Philosophy of Connectionism, Foundational Empirical Issues
  •  148
    Sins of omission and commission
    with Jon Opie
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 997-998. 2001.
    O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.
    Aspects of ConsciousnessScience of Visual Consciousness
  •  146
    Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain
    with Jonathan Opie
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 966-967. 1999.
    In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism
    The Inverted Spectrum
  •  47
    Book Review of D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind (review)
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessZombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  186
    What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the higher-order thought theory of consciousness?
    with Jonathan Opie
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 778-779. 1999.
    Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that con…Read more
    Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.
    Conscious and Unconscious MemoryHigher-Order Thought Theories of ConsciousnessUnconscious Processes,…Read more
    Conscious and Unconscious MemoryHigher-Order Thought Theories of ConsciousnessUnconscious Processes, Misc
  •  287
    The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended
    Metascience 7 8-83. 1998.
    This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
    Objections to Extended Cognition
  •  66
    Language and thought
    with J. Opie
    This issue brings together papers by Australasian philosophers on language, thought, and their relationship. Contributors were given complete freedom to treat these topics in any way they saw fit. The results reflect the diverse interests of Australasian philosophers, and, perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of philosophical methods they employ to pursue these interests.
    The Role of Language in ThoughtMethodology of Linguistics
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