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223The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extendedMetascience 7 8-83. 1998.This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clarks advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
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24This issue brings together papers by Australasian philosophers on language, thought, and their relationship. Contributors were given complete freedom to treat these topics in any way they saw fit. The results reflect the diverse interests of Australasian philosophers, and, perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of philosophical methods they employ to pursue these interests.
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51Defending the semantic conception of computation in cognitive scienceJournal of Cognitive Science 12 (4): 381-99. 2011.Cognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various accounts of computation found in the literature, the largest fracture exists between those that unpack computation in semantic terms (and hence view computation as the processing of representations) and …Read more
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38Distinctions: Subpersonal and subconsciousPsycoloquy. 1993.Puccetti argues that Dennett's views on split brains are defective. First, we criticise Puccetti's argument. Then we distinguish persons, minds, consciousnesses, selves and personalities. Then we introduce the concepts of part-persons and part-consciousnesses, and apply them to clarifying the situation. Finally, we criticise Dennett for some contribution to the confusion.
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58The role of representation in computationCognitive Processing 10 (1): 53-62. 2009.Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target syste…Read more
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77The computational baby, the classical bathwater, and the middle wayBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3): 348-349. 2002.We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only available mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Perruchet &Vinter's own noncomputational associationism.
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35Functional resemblance and the internalization of rulesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4): 695-696. 2001.Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation. [Kubovy & Epstein].
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159Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid itPhilosophical Psychology 10 (3): 269-86. 1997.When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, t…Read more
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326A connectionist theory of phenomenal experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 127-148. 1999.When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, r…Read more
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101The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the selfIn A. S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective, Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-120. 2003.One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person’s sense of agency and their sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically …Read more
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169Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousnessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 175-196. 1999.The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the ge…Read more
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75Dispensing with the dynamic unconsciousPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (2): 141-153. 2002.In recent years, a number of contemporary proponents of psychoanalysis have sought to derive support for their conjectures about the _dynamic_ unconscious from the empirical evidence in favor of the _cognitive_ unconscious. It is our contention, however, that far from supporting the dynamic unconscious, recent work in cognitive science suggests that the time has come to dispense with this concept altogether. In this paper we defend this claim in two ways. First, we argue that any attempt to shor…Read more
Adelaide, South Australia, Australia
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Physical Science |