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541Zagzebski, Authority, and FaithEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4): 47--59. 2014.Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a leading epistemologist and philosopher of religion. It is a work primarily in epistemology with applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications of the notion of epistemic authority to philosophy of religion. For, on the face of it, the notion of some kind of ”epistemic authority’ may serve as a conceptual anchor for our understanding of faith. Indeed, there is ample historical precedent for this. Faith, says Locke, is ”the assent t…Read more
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31Review of Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1). 2010.
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197Evidentialism and its Discontents (edited book)Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011.Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggest…Read more
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51In this paper I will offer a sketch of an account of knowledge which seeks to unify a number of disparate elements the inclusion of which I assume to be a desideratum of a theory of knowledge. The device I will utilize to achieve this unity-in-diversity is that of a functional property—a property multiply realizable in widely varying realization bases. The essential idea is that the property warrant is a functional property: that which epistemizes true belief, that which turns mere true belief i…Read more
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59Knowledge in an Uncertain World, by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (review)Mind 122 (488): 1078-1085. 2013.
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65Epistemic Norms (review)Analysis 77 (1): 224-232. 2017.With 13 essays, the short chapter summary approach will not work for reviewing this book.1 1 The chapters are not broken down into sections, so I can’t select representatives from sections. With not a single bad essay among them, I get no help narrowing it down that way either. I shall, then, focus on the contributions of women and more junior contributors, setting aside the chapters of the editors and others with whom I have fairly close personal connections.
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203Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic BlameEuropean Journal of Philosophy 20 (4): 534-547. 2010.Abstract: This paper argues that instances of what are typically called ‘epistemic irresponsibility’ are better understood as instances of moral or prudenial failure. This hypothesis covers the data and is simpler than postulating a new sui generis form of normativitiy. The irresponsibility alleged is that embeded in charges of ‘You should have known better!’ However, I argue, either there is some interest at stake in knowing or there is not. If there is not, then there is no irresponsibility. I…Read more
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2In defense of propositionalism about evidenceIn Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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143FallibilismIn Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Routledge. 2011.Fallibilism in epistemology is neither identical to nor unrelated to the ordinary notion of fallibility. In ordinary life we are forced to the conclusion that human beings are prone to error. The epistemological doctrine of fallibilism, though, is about the consistency of holding that humans have knowledge while admitting certain limitations in human ways of knowing. As will be seen, making the content of the basic intuition more precise is both somewhat contentious and the key to an adequate de…Read more
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13Re-Reducing Responsibility: Reply to AxtellLogos and Episteme 2 (4): 625-632. 2011.In this brief reply to Axtell, I review some general considerations pertaining to the disagreement and then reply point-by-point to Axtell's critique of thedilemma I pose for responsibilists in virtue epistemology. Thus I re-affirm my reductionist identity thesis that every case of epistemic irresponsibility is either a case of ordinary moral irresponsibility or ordinary practical irrationality.
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25Internalist Evidentialism and Epistemic Virtue: Re-reply to AxtellLogos and Episteme 3 (2): 281-289. 2012.In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value.
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168Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical TheismFaith and Philosophy 25 (2): 172-176. 2008.The thesis of this short paper is that skeptical theism does not look very plausible from the perspective of a common sense epistemology. A corollary of this isthat anyone who finds common sense epistemology plausible and is attracted to skeptical theism has some work to do to show that they can form a plausiblewhole. The dialectical situation is that to the degree that this argument is a strong one, to that same degree (at least) the theorist who would like to combinecommon sense epistemology w…Read more
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190The Problem of EvilOxford Bibliographies. 2014.This is a reference guide to contemporary work on the problem of evil with Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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465New Atheist Approaches to ReligionIn Graham Robert Oppy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Routledge. pp. 51-62. 2015.In this article, we examine in detail the New Atheists' most serious argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, namely, Richard Dawkins's Ultimate 747 Gambit. Dawkins relies upon a strong explanatory principle involving simplicity. We systematically inspect the various kinds of simplicity that Dawkins may invoke. Finding his crucial premises false on any common conception of simplicity, we conclude that Dawkins has not given good reason to think God does not exist.
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195Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical TheismFaith and Philosophy 28 (3): 332-340. 2011.I defend the position that the appearance of a conflict between common-sense epistemology and skeptical theism remains, even after one fully appreciates the role defeat plays in rational belief. In particular, Matheson’s recent attempt to establish peace is not fully successful.
Waco, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Religion |
Philosophy of Probability |
PhilPapers Editorships
Evidentialism |