•  99
    There are now countless social scientific disciplines—listed either as the science of … X … or as an -ology of one kind or another—each with their own internal controversies as to what are their “proper objects of their study.” This profusion of separate sciences has emerged, and is still emerging, tainted by the classical Cartesian-Newtonian assumption of a mechanistic world. We still seem to assume that we can begin our inquiries simply by reflecting on the world around us, and by allowing our…Read more
  •  53
    Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: Schmidt suggests a resolution to what he calls “the reality problem” by claiming that we can take processes as “the basis for the emergence of realities.” Schmidt’s resolution, however, seems to me to be merely a theoretical resolution – a re-conceptualization – whereas I think a more practical reorientation is required: we need to relate ourselves…Read more
  •  151
    Is Bhaskar's critical realism only a theoretical realism ?
    History of the Human Sciences 5 (3): 157-173. 1992.
  •  81
    Bateson, Double Description, Todes, and Embodiment: Preparing Activities and Their Relation to Abduction
    Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (2): 219-245. 2009.
    Does all understanding consist in our using concepts to relate to the things around us, or do we also possess a more direct, spontaneous, bodily way of doing so? I explore this second possibility via Bateson's notion of “double description.” These phenomena are dynamic phenomena, in that they have their existence only in our embodied relations to the temporal unfolding of events in the two or more relevant sources. As such, as Bateson put it, they are of a different “logical type” to their sourc…Read more