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277Reviews : Theodore R. Sarbin (ed.), Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct, London: Praeger Press, 1986, £34.50, xviii+303 pp (review)History of the Human Sciences 2 (2): 279-282. 1989.
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144‘Now I can go on:’ Wittgenstein and our embodied embeddedness in the ‘Hurly-Burly’ of life (review)Human Studies 19 (4). 1996.Wittgenstein is not primarily concerned with anything mysterious going on inside people's heads, but with us simply going on with each other; that is, with us being able to inter-relate our everyday, bodily activities in unproblematic ways in with those of others, in practice. Learning to communicate with clear and unequivocal meanings; to send messages; to fully understand each other; to be able to reach out, so to speak, from within language-game entwined forms of life, and to talk in theoreti…Read more
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77Goethe and the Refiguring of Intellectual InquiryJanus Head 8 (1): 132-158. 2005.Central to the paper below, is an emphasis on the spontaneously responsive nature of our living bodies, and on the special intertwined, dialogic, or chiasmic nature of events that can occur only in our meetings with others and otherness around us. As participants in such meetings, immediately responsive 'withness-understandings' become available to us that are quite different to the 'aboutness-understandings' we arrive at as disengaged, intellectual spectators. I argue that Goethe's "delicate em…Read more
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1Causalità e grammatica: Wittgenstein, Bachtin e il terzo regno dell’ordinarioDiscipline Filosofiche 8 (2). 1998.
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110Undisciplining Social Science: Wittgenstein and the Art of Creating Situated Practices of Social InquiryJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (1): 60-83. 2016.There are now countless social scientific disciplines—listed either as the science of … X … or as an -ology of one kind or another—each with their own internal controversies as to what are their “proper objects of their study.” This profusion of separate sciences has emerged, and is still emerging, tainted by the classical Cartesian-Newtonian assumption of a mechanistic world. We still seem to assume that we can begin our inquiries simply by reflecting on the world around us, and by allowing our…Read more
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58Perceiving “Things” and “Objects” from Within Processes: Resolutions Situated in PracticesConstructivist Foundations 7 (1): 24-26. 2011.Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: Schmidt suggests a resolution to what he calls “the reality problem” by claiming that we can take processes as “the basis for the emergence of realities.” Schmidt’s resolution, however, seems to me to be merely a theoretical resolution – a re-conceptualization – whereas I think a more practical reorientation is required: we need to relate ourselves…Read more
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152Is Bhaskar's critical realism only a theoretical realism ?History of the Human Sciences 5 (3): 157-173. 1992.
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University of New Hampshire, DurhamRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Social Science |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Continental Philosophy |