Larry Hickman

This brief essay examines James A. Good’s argument that the Hegel of the young Dewey was functionalist, historicist, instrumentalist, and practicalist—in short, the Hegel of “centrist” Hegelians such as those then active in St. Louis and of contemporary interpreters such as Good himself and Terry Pinkard. Good’s claims are examined in terms of possible conflicts with what is known of William James’s influence on Dewey, and in the light of recently published correspondence in which Dewey comments on the Hegelian “deposit” in his work.

This article begins with a brief attempt to ascertain Nicholas Rescher's position with respect to the different versions of pragmatism mounted by Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I then suggest that despite Rescher's self-described fealty to Peirce, his views are in some ways closer to Dewey's constructivism than he has acknowledged. I conclude, however, that his treatment of truth is quite different from Dewey's "warranted assertibility." Rescher's concept of truth appears to alternate somewhat inelegantly between truth-as-correspondence-to-fact and truth-as-trans-horizonal-limit

In addition to being one of the greatest technical philosophers of the twentieth century, John Dewey was an educational innovator, a Progressive Era reformer, and one of America’s last great public intellectuals. Dewey’s insights into the problems of public education, immigration, the prospects for democratic government, and the relation of religious faith to science are as fresh today as when they were first published. His penetrating treatments of the nature and function of philosophy, the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of life, and the role of inquiry in human experience are of increasing relevance at the turn of the 21st century. Based on the award-winning 37-volume critical edition of Dewey’s work, The Essential Dewey presents for the first time a collection of Dewey’s writings that is both manageable and comprehensive. The volume includes essays and book chapters that exhibit Dewey’s intellectual development over time; the selection represents his mature thinking on every major issue to which he turned his attention. Eleven part divisions cover: Dewey in Context; Reconstructing Philosophy; Evolutionary Naturalism; Pragmatic Metaphysics; Habit, Conduct, and Language; Meaning, Truth, and Inquiry; Valuation and Ethics; The Aims of Education; The Individual, the Community, and Democracy; Pragmatism and Culture: Science and Technology, Art and Religion; and Interpretations and Critiques. Taken as a whole, this collection provides unique access to Dewey’s understanding of the problems and prospects of human existence and of the philosophical enterprise

This article contains a brief discussion of some of the key concepts of John Dewey's theory of inquiry. Dewey presented his theory of inquiry differently to different audiences, such as fellow philosophers, teachers, and the public. Nevertheless, his many accounts exhibit a common pattern: inquiry arises out of unsettled situations, proceeds by the formulation and testing of hypotheses, and contains an affective dimension. Proposed solutions must be tested in the domain of existential affairs. Even when they are accepted, their warrant is only provisional

After reviewing current proposals for standardized testing in K-12 education (United States) and for imposition of free-market economic and business models on higher education (Texas, Florida, and the United Kingdom), I argue that both types of proposals rest on flawed pedagogical assumptions and tend to undermine educational practices that promote the development of global citizens. I suggest that John Dewey was aware of the type of challenges now faced by educators and that he provided tools for blunting the force of these proposals and moving educational practice toward more desirable ends.

After summarizing what I take to be the main contribution of Norton’s book––his proposal for a new vocabulary for public discourse as it pertains to environmental stability––I attempt to locate his work among some of the current debates regarding sustainability and public policy. I detail some of the ways in which this work constitutes a further development of themes he presented in 1991 in Toward unity Among Environmentalists. I discuss his prescriptions for defusing confrontations regarding environmental policy by functionalizing issues in ways that cut across historically entrenched interest groups. From the standpoint of method, I␣argue that Norton has stacked a Habermas- type proceduralism on top of a pragmatic experimentalist platform (and I add that if he had constructed his method the other way around it would not have worked.) In all this I find Norton’s proposals both imaginative and full of promise.

Rad razmatra predavanja o globalnoj etici koje je držao John Dewey tijekom svojih međunarodnih putovanja, posebno tijekom dvije godine koje je proveo u Kini . Tvrdim da je Deweyev naturalizam, utemeljen na uvažavanju načina na koje se djelo Charlesa Darwina može primijeniti u humanističkim disciplinama, pruža modele za međukulturalnu etičku diskusiju. Smatram da se neke prepreke uvažavanju Deweyevog doprinosa globalnoj etici mogu naći u pogrešnim čitanjima i krivim interpretacijama njegovog djela, poput onih koje je razvio Roberto M. Unger. Naposljetku, smatram da postoji mala vjerojatnost pojave globalne etike sve dok ljudi ne nadiđu uske nad-naturalističke i ne-naturalističke dogme i ne prihvate naturalističke svjetonazore

Just as the Hegelians of the nineteenth century divided themselves into left and right, so it is with twentieth-century interpreters of Dewey. The captain of the left is of course Richard Rorty, who regularly announces the death of metaphysics and toasts the longevity of rhetoric. The agenda of the other side, the Deweyan right, has now been ably advanced by Raymond Boisvert's Dewey's Metaphysics, which presents Dewey in the role of a post-Darwinian Aristotle. Like Aristotle, Boisvert writes, Dewey both presented a coherent account of ontology and articulated a set of categories. But whereas Aristotle was concerned with substance and accident, Dewey's units of discourse are "event" and "form."

Let me begin by thanking the society’s officers: President Kathleen Knight-Abowitz, President-Elect Len Waks, immediate past President Deron Boyles, Secretary-Treasurer Kyle Greenwalt, membership and development officer Mark Kissling, and of course student liaison Matt Ryg and webmaster Zane Wubbena. I know that their many efforts on behalf of this society are much appreciated by all of us.In 1955, when Will Herberg published his influential book, Protestant–Catholic–Jew, it could be said with some confidence that an essay in American religious sociology could claim exhaustive coverage by restricting its analysis to those three faiths. Scarcely a decade later, however, that formula would be obsolescent. The 1960s...

This essay argues that "the family" should be understood in functional terms:whatever functions as a family should have the legal status of a family. Theauthor's argument thus avoids two extreme positions. The first is the position ofthe hard-line "platonic" essentialists who, on grounds of nature, supernature, orcultural history, argue that a family unit must comprise heterosexual partners.The second is the position of the radical relativist, who argues that there are noessences whatsoever or that essences are purely arbitrary. Treating the family infunctionalist terms, the author argues, would have positive consequences thatwould strengthen the social fabric.

In addition to being one of the greatest technical philosophers of the twentieth century, John Dewey was an educational innovator, a Progressive Era reformer, and one of America’s last great public intellectuals. Dewey’s insights into the problems of public education, immigration, the prospects for democratic government, and the relation of religious faith to science are as fresh today as when they were first published. His penetrating treatments of the nature and function of philosophy, the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of life, and the role of inquiry in human experience are of increasing relevance at the turn of the 21st century. Based on the award-winning 37-volume critical edition of Dewey’s work, The Essential Dewey presents for the first time a collection of Dewey’s writings that is both manageable and comprehensive. The volume includes essays and book chapters that exhibit Dewey’s intellectual development over time; the selection represents his mature thinking on every major issue to which he turned his attention. Eleven part divisions cover: Dewey in Context; Reconstructing Philosophy; Evolutionary Naturalism; Pragmatic Metaphysics; Habit, Conduct, and Language; Meaning, Truth, and Inquiry; Valuation and Ethics; The Aims of Education; The Individual, the Community, and Democracy; Pragmatism and Culture: Science and Technology, Art and Religion; and Interpretations and Critiques. Taken as a whole, this collection provides unique access to Dewey’s understanding of the problems and prospects of human existence and of the philosophical enterprise

Diese Abhandlung untersucht die Erkenntnisse über globale Ethik, die Dewey während seiner internationalen Reisen, insbesondere während seines zweijährigen Aufenthalts in China 1919–1921, gewonnen hat. Ich behaupte, dass Deweys Naturalismus, welcher auf einem Verständnis der Möglichkeiten basiert, Charles Darwins Arbeit in den Geisteswissenschaften anzuwenden, Modelle für interkulturelle Diskussionen liefert. Ich weise darauf hin, dass ei nige der Hindernisse, Deweys Beitrag zur globalen Ethik anzuerkennen, in falschem Lesen und falscher Deutung seiner Arbeit liegen, so wie jene, die von Roberto Unger avanciert wur den. Letztendlich behaupte ich, dass das Auftreten einer globalen Ethik solange unwahrscheinlich sein wird, bis die Menschen die engen supernaturalistischen und nicht-naturalistischen Dogmen überschreiten und sich die naturalistischen Weltansichten zueigen machen