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65Review of Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2013. 2013.
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408Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and BenefitsSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (4): 7-13. 2015.
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303Against Actual-World Reliabilism: Epistemically Correct Procedures and Reliably True OutcomesIn Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, Oxford University Press Uk. 2016.
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162Testimonial justification: Inferential or non-inferential?Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222). 2006.Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for matur…Read more
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3212The Function of PerceptionIn Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library. pp. 13-31. 2014.What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perce…Read more
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468Russell’s Logical Construction of the External WorldIn Diego E. Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 454-466. 2018.
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1269Does Justification Aim at Truth?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1): 51-72. 2011.Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aim…Read more
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22The Relativist Response to Radical SkepticismIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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