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131The theoretical diagnosis of skepticismSynthese 158 (1): 19-39. 2007.Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the l…Read more
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250Transferring knowledgeNoûs 34 (1). 2000.Our folk epistemology says that if someone knows that P and tells you that P, then, given the absence of defeaters, if you believe what they tell you, you will come to know that P as well. A speaker's knowledge that P is then, for the most part, enough for a hearer to come to know that P. But there are counterexamples to this principle: testimonial knowledge does not always transfer from the speaker to the hearer. Why should that be so? Because testimonial knowledge arises through the flow of in…Read more
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4Review of Miriam Schiefer McCormick: Believing Against the Evidence (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 10 (5). 2015.
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579Epistemic EntitlementNoûs 46 (3): 449-482. 2012.What is the best account of process reliabilism about epistemic justification, especially epistemic entitlement? I argue that entitlement consists in the normal functioning (proper operation) of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Etiological functions involve consequence explanation: a belief-forming process has forming true beliefs reliably as a function just in case forming-true beliefs reliably partly explains the persiste…Read more
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454Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony: Burge on the A Priori Basis of Testimonial EntitlementIn Andreas Stokke & Eliot Michaelson (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, Oxford University Press. pp. 85-112. 2018.According to the Acceptance Principle, a person is entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true (asserted) and that is intelligible to him or her, unless there are stronger reasons not to. Burge assumes this Principle and then argues that it has an apriori justification, basis or rationale. This paper expounds Burge's teleological reliability framework and the details of his a priori justification for the Principle. It then raises three significant doubts.
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1117Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of ComprehensionIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174. 2008.This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted that P) t…Read more
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859Metaphysical libertarianism and the epistemology of testimonyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1): 37-50. 2004.Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might…Read more
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