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66Direction of FitIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” belief, e.g…Read more
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111Why "oughts" are not facts (or what the tortoise and Achilles taught mrs. Ganderhoot and me about practical reason)Mind 104 (416): 713-723. 1995.
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12How not to reply to a moral scepticAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (3). 1983.This Article does not have an abstract
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21The Notion of "Incitement"Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (2). 1974.The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question of how it is that a person who incites another to do something can be held morally responsible for this second person's acts. Professor bruce franklin's dismissal from stanford university is taken as the main example and it is argued that though those incited act 'because' of what the incitor does, This 'because' is not explainable on the standard models of physical causation, Coercion or hypnosis. It is closer to the truth to think of the…Read more
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109Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of actionOxford University Press. 2003.People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the…Read more
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47Doing Things for Reasons (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2): 495-497. 2004.The area of philosophy blandly labeled ‘practical reason’ is in reality something of a minefield of conflicting theories, problematic distinctions and difficult problems. There are Humean ‘desire-belief’ theories in conflict with Kantian views that deny the importance of desires. There are said to be important distinctions between internal and external reasons, and justifying and motivating reasons, as well as internalist and externalist accounts of reasons. And there are the problems of akrasia…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |