•  52
    Theory testing in experimental biology: the chemiosmotic mechanism of ATP synthesis
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1): 29-52. 2002.
    Historians of biology have argued that much of the dynamics of experimental disciplines such as genetics or molecular biology can be understood from studying experimental systems and model organisms alone . Such accounts contrast sharply with more traditional philosophies of science which viewed scientific research essentially as a process of inventing and testing theories. I present a case from the history of biochemistry which can be viewed from both the experimental systems perspective and fr…Read more
  •  45
    I defend the view that single experiments can provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses against the widely held belief that “crucial experiments” are impossible. My argument is based on the examination of a historical case from molecular biology, namely the Meselson-Stahl experiment. “The most beautiful experiment in biology”, as it is known, provided the first experimental evidence for the operation of a semi-conservative mechanism of DNA replication, as predict…Read more
  •  22
    This paper examines how experimental scientists choose theoretical frameworks as well as their experimental systems for doing research. I start out with Kuhn's claim that there are no algorithms that could determine the coices made by individual scientists. Samir Okasha has recently provided an argument for this claim in terms of social choice theory, which I briefly discuss. Then, I show why this problem is not relevant in an experimental science. There are social mechanisms in place that make …Read more
  •  283
    Behavioral traits, the intentional stance, and biological functions
    In Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas A. C. Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology, Springer. pp. 317-328. 2011.
    It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuati…Read more
  •  415
    Philosophie der Lebenswissenschaften
    with Susanne Bauer, Lara Huber, Marie I. Kaiser, Lara Keuck, Ulrich Krohs, Maria Kronfeldner, Peter McLaughlin, Kären Nickelson, Thomas Reydon, Neil Roughley, Christian Sachse, Marianne Schark, Georg Toepfer, and Markus Wild
    Information Philosophie 4 14-27. 2013.
    This paper summarizes (in German) recent tendencies in the philosophy of the life sciences.
  •  63
    Representing genes: Classical mapping techniques and the growth of genetical knowledge
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 29 (2): 295-315. 1998.
  •  138
    Incommensurability and theory comparison in experimental biology
    Biology and Philosophy 17 (2): 155-169. 2002.
    Incommensurability of scientific theories, as conceived by Thomas Kuhnand Paul Feyerabend, is thought to be a major or even insurmountable obstacletothe empirical comparison of these theories. I examine this problem in light ofaconcrete case from the history of experimental biology, namely the oxidativephosphorylation controversy in biochemistry (ca. 1961-1977). After a briefhistorical exposition, I show that the two main competing theories which werethe subject of the ox-phos controversy instan…Read more
  •  75
    Collective Epistemology (edited book)
    Ontos. 2011.
    The aim of this volume is to examine this claim, and to place it in the wider context of recent epistemological debates about the role of sociality in knowledge acquisition.
  •  738
    Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds
    In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. 2014.
    This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not do justice…Read more
  •  8
    Under the Lamppost
    In Peter McLaughlin, Peter Machamer & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 231. 2001.
  •  244
    Life in a Physical World: The Place of the Life Sciences
    In F. Stadler, D. Dieks, W. Gonzales, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 155--168. 2010.
  •  77
    Fitness made physical: The supervenience of biological concepts revisited
    Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 411-431. 1996.
    The supervenience and multiple realizability of biological properties have been invoked to support a disunified picture of the biological sciences. I argue that supervenience does not capture the relation between fitness and an organism's physical properties. The actual relation is one of causal dependence and is, therefore, amenable to causal explanation. A case from optimality theory is presented and interpreted as a microreductive explanation of fitness difference. Such microreductions can ha…Read more
  •  65
    Critical Notice: D arwinian Reductionism
    Biology and Philosophy 23 (1): 143-152. 2008.
    This notice provides a critical discussion of some of the issues from Alex Rosenberg’s Darwinian Reductionism, in particular proper functions and the relationship of proximate and ultimate biology, developmental programs and genocentrism, biological laws, the principle of natural selection as a fundamental law, genetic determinism, and the definition of “reductionism.”
  •  71
    Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation (edited book)
    with Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, and Stephan Hartmann
    Springer. 2011.
    This volume, the second in the Springer series Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, contains selected papers from the workshops organised by the ESF ...
  •  874
    Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so-called "model organisms") in order to model or simulate biological processes. I argue here that experimental modeling is a bona fide form of scientific modeling that plays an epistemic role that is distinct from that of ordinary biological experiments. What distinguishes them from ordinary experiments is that they use what I call "in vivo representations" where one kind of causal process is used to stand in…Read more
  •  339
    Indeterminism in neurobiology
    Philosophy of Science 72 (5): 663-674. 2005.
    I examine different arguments that could be used to establish indeterminism of neurological processes. Even though scenarios where single events at the molecular level make the difference in the outcome of such processes are realistic, this falls short of establishing indeterminism, because it is not clear that these molecular events are subject to quantum mechanical uncertainty. Furthermore, attempts to argue for indeterminism autonomously (i.e., independently of quantum mechanics) fail, becaus…Read more
  •  44
    Evolutionary plasticity in prokaryotes: A panglossian view
    Biology and Philosophy 11 (1): 67-88. 1996.
    Enzyme directed genetic mechanisms causing random DNA sequence alterations are ubiquitous in both eukaryotes and prokaryotes. A number of molecular geneticist have invoked adaptation through natural selection to account for this fact, however, alternative explanations have also flourished. The population geneticist G.C. Williams has dismissed the possibility of selection for mutator activity on a priori grounds. In this paper, I attempt a refutation of Williams' argument. In addition, I discuss …Read more
  •  31
    Über die Vergleichbarkeit metaphysischer Systeme: Der Fall Leibniz kontra Locke
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (2). 2005.
    Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Vergleichbarkeit metaphysischer Systeme an einem historischen Fallbeispiel, Leibniz' Kritik an Locke. Die zentrale Frage ist, wie weit es Leibniz gelingt, Lockes Thesen zu widerlegen ohne dabei einfach Behauptungen aus seinem eigenen System vorauszusetzen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Leibniz dies nur bei der Frage nach der Existenz eingeborener Ideen gelingt, nicht aber bei der Denkfähigkeit der Materie oder der Existenz unbewusster mentaler Vorgänge. Die Quellen dieser U…Read more
  •  634
    The Central Dogma as a Thesis of Causal Specificity
    History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28 (4): 595-610. 2006.
    I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses "Sequence Hypothesis" and "Central Dogma" in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificit…Read more
  •  56
    I examine the adequacy of the causal graph-structural equations approach to causation for modeling biological mechanisms. I focus in particular on mechanisms with complex dynamics such as the PER biological clock mechanism in Drosophila. I show that a quantitative model of this mechanism that uses coupled differential equations – the well-known Goldbeter model – cannot be adequately represented in the standard causal graph framework, even though this framework does permit causal cycles. The reas…Read more
  •  3289
    Hans Drieschs argumente für den Vitalismus
    Philosophia Naturalis 36 (2): 263-293. 1999.
    Ich rekonstruiere und kritisiere Hans Drieschs Argumentation für die Behauptung, daß biologischen Prozessen nur eine substanzdualistische Ontologie der belebten Materie (Vitalismus) gerecht werden kann. Meine Diagnose lautet, daß Drieschs Argumentation zwar logisch schlüssig ist bzw. durch leichte Modifikationen in eine logisch gültige Form gebracht werden kann, aber von empirisch unbegründeten, metaphysischen Prämissen über die Möglichkeiten eines energieumwandelnden Mechanismus ausgeht.
  •  208
    This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley’s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular …Read more
  •  47
    Probabilities, Laws and Structure (edited book)
    Springer. 2012.
    This conception of natural kinds might be dubbed a 'structural kinds' view. It is the conception of kinds offered by ExtOSR within a Humean framework. To invoke structural kinds also means to invoke structural laws. For laws generalize over ...
  •  417
    Genes, Causation and Intentionality
    History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4): 399-411. 2005.
    I want to exhibit the deeper metaphysical reasons why some common ways of describing the causal role of genes in development and evolution are problematic. Specifically, I show why using the concept of information in an intentional sense in genetics is inappropriate, even given a naturalistic account of intentionality. Furthermore, I argue that descriptions that use notions such as programming, directing or orchestrating are problematic not for empirical reasons, but because they are not strictl…Read more
  •  112
    The aim and structure of ecological theory
    Philosophy of Science 66 (1): 71-93. 1999.
    I present an attempt at an explication of the ecological theory of interspecific competition, including its explanatory role in community ecology and evolutionary biology. The account given is based on the idea that law-like statements play an important role in scientific theories of this kind. I suggest that the principle of competitive exclusion is such a law, and that it is evolutionarily invariant. The principle's empirical status is defended and implications for the ongoing debates on the e…Read more