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31Über die Vergleichbarkeit metaphysischer Systeme: Der Fall Leibniz kontra LockeZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (2). 2005.Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Vergleichbarkeit metaphysischer Systeme an einem historischen Fallbeispiel, Leibniz' Kritik an Locke. Die zentrale Frage ist, wie weit es Leibniz gelingt, Lockes Thesen zu widerlegen ohne dabei einfach Behauptungen aus seinem eigenen System vorauszusetzen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Leibniz dies nur bei der Frage nach der Existenz eingeborener Ideen gelingt, nicht aber bei der Denkfähigkeit der Materie oder der Existenz unbewusster mentaler Vorgänge. Die Quellen dieser U…Read more
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621The Central Dogma as a Thesis of Causal SpecificityHistory and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 28 (4): 595-610. 2006.I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses "Sequence Hypothesis" and "Central Dogma" in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificit…Read more
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56I examine the adequacy of the causal graph-structural equations approach to causation for modeling biological mechanisms. I focus in particular on mechanisms with complex dynamics such as the PER biological clock mechanism in Drosophila. I show that a quantitative model of this mechanism that uses coupled differential equations – the well-known Goldbeter model – cannot be adequately represented in the standard causal graph framework, even though this framework does permit causal cycles. The reas…Read more
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3268Hans Drieschs argumente für den VitalismusPhilosophia Naturalis 36 (2): 263-293. 1999.Ich rekonstruiere und kritisiere Hans Drieschs Argumentation für die Behauptung, daß biologischen Prozessen nur eine substanzdualistische Ontologie der belebten Materie (Vitalismus) gerecht werden kann. Meine Diagnose lautet, daß Drieschs Argumentation zwar logisch schlüssig ist bzw. durch leichte Modifikationen in eine logisch gültige Form gebracht werden kann, aber von empirisch unbegründeten, metaphysischen Prämissen über die Möglichkeiten eines energieumwandelnden Mechanismus ausgeht.
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206Causes without mechanisms: Experimental regularities, physical laws, and neuroscientific explanationPhilosophy of Science 75 (5): 995-1007. 2008.This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley’s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular …Read more
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47Probabilities, Laws and Structure (edited book)Springer. 2012.This conception of natural kinds might be dubbed a 'structural kinds' view. It is the conception of kinds offered by ExtOSR within a Humean framework. To invoke structural kinds also means to invoke structural laws. For laws generalize over ...
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397Genes, Causation and IntentionalityHistory and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 27 (3/4): 399-411. 2005.I want to exhibit the deeper metaphysical reasons why some common ways of describing the causal role of genes in development and evolution are problematic. Specifically, I show why using the concept of information in an intentional sense in genetics is inappropriate, even given a naturalistic account of intentionality. Furthermore, I argue that descriptions that use notions such as programming, directing or orchestrating are problematic not for empirical reasons, but because they are not strictl…Read more
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109The aim and structure of ecological theoryPhilosophy of Science 66 (1): 71-93. 1999.I present an attempt at an explication of the ecological theory of interspecific competition, including its explanatory role in community ecology and evolutionary biology. The account given is based on the idea that law-like statements play an important role in scientific theories of this kind. I suggest that the principle of competitive exclusion is such a law, and that it is evolutionarily invariant. The principle's empirical status is defended and implications for the ongoing debates on the e…Read more
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35I examine some philosophical arguments as well as current empirical research in molecular neurobiology in order to throw some new light on the question of whether neurological processes are deterministic or indeterministic. I begin by showing that the idea of an autonomous biological indeterminism violates the principle of the supervenience of biological properties on physical properties. If supervenience is accepted, quantum mechanics is the only hope for the neuro-indeterminist. But this would…Read more
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972Experimentation versus Theory Choice: A Social-Epistemological ApproachIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology, Ontos. pp. 20--203. 2011.
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15Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Structure and Synthesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 280 pp., $75.00 (review)Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 469-471. 2006.
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680Which Kind of Causal Specificity Matters Biologically?Philosophy of Science 84 (3): 574-585. 2017.Griffiths et al. (2015) have proposed a quantitative measure of causal specificity and used it to assess various attempts to single out genetic causes as being causally more specific than other cellular mechanisms, for example, alternative splicing. Focusing in particular on developmental processes, they have identified a number of important challenges for this project. In this discussion note, I would like to show how these challenges can be met.
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960Causal Selection versus Causal Parity in Biology: Relevant Counterfactuals and Biologically Normal InterventionsIn Brian J. Hanley & C. Kenneth Waters (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Causal Reasoning in Biology. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science. Vol. XXI., University of Minnesota Press. forthcoming.Causal selection is the task of picking out, from a field of known causally relevant factors, some factors as elements of an explanation. The Causal Parity Thesis in the philosophy of biology challenges the usual ways of making such selections among different causes operating in a developing organism. The main target of this thesis is usually gene centrism, the doctrine that genes play some special role in ontogeny, which is often described in terms of information-bearing or programming. This pa…Read more
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13Ron Amundson: The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Structure and Synthesis (review)Philosophy of Science 73 (4): 469-471. 2006.
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109Determinism, realism, and probability in evolutionary theoryProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3). 2001.Recent discussion of the statistical character of evolutionary theory has centered around two positions: (1) Determinism combined with the claim that the statistical character is eliminable, a subjective interpretation of probability, and instrumentalism; (2) Indeterminism combined with the claim that the statistical character is ineliminable, a propensity interpretation of probability, and realism. I point out some internal problems in these positions and show that the relationship between dete…Read more
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51Theory testing in experimental biology: the chemiosmotic mechanism of ATP synthesisStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1): 29-52. 2002.Historians of biology have argued that much of the dynamics of experimental disciplines such as genetics or molecular biology can be understood from studying experimental systems and model organisms alone . Such accounts contrast sharply with more traditional philosophies of science which viewed scientific research essentially as a process of inventing and testing theories. I present a case from the history of biochemistry which can be viewed from both the experimental systems perspective and fr…Read more
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45I defend the view that single experiments can provide a sufficient reason for preferring one among a group of hypotheses against the widely held belief that “crucial experiments” are impossible. My argument is based on the examination of a historical case from molecular biology, namely the Meselson-Stahl experiment. “The most beautiful experiment in biology”, as it is known, provided the first experimental evidence for the operation of a semi-conservative mechanism of DNA replication, as predict…Read more
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33Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse, biology and the foundation of ethicsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1): 79-82. 2001.
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22This paper examines how experimental scientists choose theoretical frameworks as well as their experimental systems for doing research. I start out with Kuhn's claim that there are no algorithms that could determine the coices made by individual scientists. Samir Okasha has recently provided an argument for this claim in terms of social choice theory, which I briefly discuss. Then, I show why this problem is not relevant in an experimental science. There are social mechanisms in place that make …Read more
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268Behavioral traits, the intentional stance, and biological functionsIn Kathryn Plaisance & Thomas A. C. Reydon (eds.), Philosophy of Behavioral Biology, Springer. pp. 317-328. 2011.It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuati…Read more
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399Philosophie der LebenswissenschaftenInformation Philosophie 4 14-27. 2013.This paper summarizes (in German) recent tendencies in the philosophy of the life sciences.
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62Representing genes: Classical mapping techniques and the growth of genetical knowledgeStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 29 (2): 295-315. 1998.
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137Incommensurability and theory comparison in experimental biologyBiology and Philosophy 17 (2): 155-169. 2002.Incommensurability of scientific theories, as conceived by Thomas Kuhnand Paul Feyerabend, is thought to be a major or even insurmountable obstacletothe empirical comparison of these theories. I examine this problem in light ofaconcrete case from the history of experimental biology, namely the oxidativephosphorylation controversy in biochemistry (ca. 1961-1977). After a briefhistorical exposition, I show that the two main competing theories which werethe subject of the ox-phos controversy instan…Read more
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5Epistemologie des Konkreten: Studien zur Geschichte der modernen Biologie (review)Isis 98 (2): 665-666. 2007.
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67Collective Epistemology (edited book)Ontos. 2011.The aim of this volume is to examine this claim, and to place it in the wider context of recent epistemological debates about the role of sociality in knowledge acquisition.
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723Reference, Truth, and Biological KindsIn: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. 2014.This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not do justice…Read more
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8Under the LamppostIn Peter McLaughlin, Peter Machamer & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 231. 2001.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Biology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |