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2Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, Love Online: Emotions on the Internet Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 24 (5): 311-313. 2004.
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2The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics (review)Mind 113 (449): 198-201. 2004.
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1Introspection as the Rosetta stone: Millstone or fifth wheel?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3): 428-429. 1982.
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1Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 11 (2): 138-139. 1991.
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6Emotion and self-deceptionIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception, University of California Press. 1988.
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8Critical Notice of Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions (review)Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2): 335-350. 1979.
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7Perversion and DeathThe Monist 86 (1): 90-114. 2003.Philosophers like to warn against fools’ paradises: not places where fools can safely cavort, but rather conditions in which fools mistakenly think themselves happy. The warning presupposes that real and merely apparent happiness can be told apart. Of course that claim is not altogether disinterested, since philosophers have a professional investment in the distinction. Thus they have endorsed this or that attitude to death, holding up promises of ultimate comfort or threats of excruciating regr…Read more
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10Kinds of kinds: Individuality and biological speciesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2). 1989.
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11The sociology of sociobiologyInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3). 1990.Abstract This paper turns the tables on the criticisms of sociobiology that stem from a sociological perspective; many of those criticisms lack cogency and coherence in such measure as to demand, in their turn, a psycho?sociological explanation rather than a rational justification. This thesis, after a brief exposition of the main ideas of sociobiology, is argued in terms of four of the most prominent complaints made against it. Far from embodying tired prejudices about the psychological and soc…Read more
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8Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotionsPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8. 2002.Mangan draws his inspiration from James's account of fringe consciousness, but differs from James in focusing on something non-sensory, necessarily fuzzy, though not necessarily fleeting. A long tradition in philosophy has deemed non-sensory elements of consciousness to be indispensable to thought. But those, chiefly conceptual, forms of non-sensory fringe are not Mangan's focus. What then is Mangan talking about? This commentary envisages a number of possible answers, and tentatively concludes …Read more
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124Review of Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (6). 2008.
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3Does the eye know calculus? The threshold of representation in classical and connectionist modelsInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2). 1991.Abstract The notion of representation lies at the crossroads of questions about the nature of belief and knowledge, meaning, and intentionality. But there is some hope that it might be simpler than all those. If we could understand it clearly, it might then help to explicate those more difficult notions. In this paper, my central aim is to find a principled criterion, along lines that make biological sense, for deciding just when it becomes theoretically plausible to ascribe to some process or s…Read more
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54Prcis of “why think?” Evolution and the rational mindAmerican Journal of Bioethics 8 (5). 2008.This Article does not have an abstract
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C. G. PRADO, "Making Believe: Philosophical Reflections on Fiction" (review)Dialogue 26 (3): 595. 1987.
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21Moral emotionsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2): 109-126. 2001.Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions…Read more
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Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, Love Online: Emotions on the Internet (review)Philosophy in Review 24 311-313. 2004.
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9The mind's Bermuda Triangle: philosophy of emotions and empirical scienceIn Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (review)Philosophy in Review 11 138-139. 1991.
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10Evolution et rationalitéPresses universitaires de France. 2004.À quoi bon la pensée? Pour de nombreux chercheurs, inspirés par les théories évolutionnistes, la pensée réfléchie est utile à notre espèce. Elle lui confère des avantages importants et contribue à son succès reproductif. Pourtant ses avantages ne sont pas si évidents. La pensée ne figure ni dans les mécanismes de l'évolution qui ont façonné la vie, ni parmi les procédés dont se servent la plupart des organismes pour s'y maintenir. Dans Évolution et rationalité, Ronald de Sousa montre que, pour c…Read more
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64Restoring emotion's bad rep: the moral randomness of normsEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1): 29-47. 2006.Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at …Read more
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Comments on Barbara S. Stengel: Thinking about Thinking: Wilfred Sellars' Theory on InductionPhilosophy of Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society 43 259-262. 1987.
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5Paradoxical emotionsIn Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality, Oxford University Press. 2003.