The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence
gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the
language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued
that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language
faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally
existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions
must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend
this …
Read moreThe new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence
gives us knowledge *of* a language, and that the representations in the
language faculty are representations *of* anything. In reply, I have argued
that through their intuitions speaker/hearers, (but not their language
faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally
existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions
must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend
this idea against the objections Collins has raised to such an account.
